Audit only intentional auth actions, not automatic 401/403 gates.

Stop recording unauthorized/forbidden/password-gate and silent refresh; keep login, logout, and failed-login style events.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
This commit is contained in:
oliver 2026-09-01 21:51:59 +08:00
parent d35d3992c2
commit 61531e524f
5 changed files with 35 additions and 127 deletions

View file

@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import logging
import queue
import threading
import time
from typing import Any
from .config import settings
@ -19,13 +18,6 @@ _lock = threading.Lock()
_counter = 0
_dropped = 0
# Dedupe unauthenticated request floods (SPA fires many parallel 401s).
_unauth_lock = threading.Lock()
_unauth_recent: dict[str, float] = {}
_UNAUTH_DEDUP_GET_SEC = 60.0
_UNAUTH_DEDUP_WRITE_SEC = 15.0
_UNAUTH_RECENT_MAX = 4000
# Middleware-tagged HTTP wrappers that duplicate semantic business audits.
_MIDDLEWARE_NOISE_ACTIONS = frozenset(
{
@ -37,6 +29,10 @@ _MIDDLEWARE_NOISE_ACTIONS = frozenset(
"webcrt.delete",
"users.get",
"api_tokens.get",
# Legacy auto-gate noise (no longer written; hide historical rows).
"auth.unauthorized",
"auth.password_change_required",
"auth.forbidden_scope",
}
)
@ -46,6 +42,7 @@ _AUTH_READ_NOISE_ACTIONS = frozenset(
{
"auth.me",
"auth.sessions",
"auth.refresh",
}
)
@ -69,32 +66,6 @@ def _sample_ok() -> bool:
return (_counter % n) == 0
def should_audit_unauthorized(*, client_ip: str, method: str, path: str) -> bool:
"""Rate-limit auth.unauthorized writes: one row per IP+method+path per window.
Unauthenticated page loads often fan out dozens of GETs in the same second;
keeping every 401 drowns real login/security events.
"""
method_u = str(method or "GET").upper()
window = (
_UNAUTH_DEDUP_WRITE_SEC
if method_u in ("POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE")
else _UNAUTH_DEDUP_GET_SEC
)
key = f"{client_ip or '-'}|{method_u}|{path or '/'}"
now = time.monotonic()
with _unauth_lock:
global _unauth_recent
last = float(_unauth_recent.get(key) or 0.0)
if now - last < window:
return False
_unauth_recent[key] = now
if len(_unauth_recent) > _UNAUTH_RECENT_MAX:
cutoff = now - max(_UNAUTH_DEDUP_GET_SEC * 5, 300.0)
_unauth_recent = {k: v for k, v in _unauth_recent.items() if float(v) >= cutoff}
return True
def audit_should_persist(
*,
action: str,
@ -105,13 +76,12 @@ def audit_should_persist(
"""Decide whether a candidate audit event is worth writing.
Policy:
- Always keep auth login/logout/security events, users/tokens/NE/port_traffic/config_sync,
and semantic webcrt session/command events.
- Drop successful ``auth.me`` / ``auth.sessions`` polls (UI session checks).
- Always keep HTTP failures (status >= 400), except pure list noise.
- Drop successful GET/HEAD/OPTIONS ``http.*`` (page polling).
- Always keep mutating ``http.*`` (POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE) — no sampling.
- Drop middleware ``webcrt.{method}`` / ``audit.list`` (covered by business events).
- Keep intentional ops: auth.login/logout/login_failed, users/tokens/NE/port_traffic/
config_sync, semantic webcrt session/command.
- Drop anonymous 401 / auto-gate noise (unauthorized, forbidden_scope, …).
- Drop successful ``auth.me`` / ``auth.sessions`` / ``auth.refresh`` polls.
- Drop successful GET/HEAD/OPTIONS ``http.*``; keep mutating http.* and failures.
- Drop middleware ``webcrt.{method}`` / ``audit.list``.
"""
del path # reserved for future path allow/deny lists
act = str(action or "")

View file

@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ from starlette.responses import JSONResponse, Response
from .auth_deps import resolve_user_from_token
from .auth_scopes import has_scope, required_scope_for_request
from .auth_service import write_audit
from .config import settings
from .db import SessionLocal
@ -113,55 +112,19 @@ class AuthAuditMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
try:
resolved = resolve_user_from_token(db, token) if token else None
if resolved is None:
client_ip = _client_ip(request)
from .audit_async import should_audit_unauthorized
if should_audit_unauthorized(client_ip=client_ip, method=request.method, path=path):
write_audit(
db,
action="auth.unauthorized",
method=request.method,
path=path,
status_code=401,
client_ip=client_ip,
user_agent=str(request.headers.get("user-agent") or "")[:512],
detail={},
)
# Do not audit anonymous 401s — SPA fan-out floods the log.
# Intentional auth ops (login/logout/login_failed) are written in auth_router.
return JSONResponse(status_code=401, content={"detail": "unauthorized"})
user, via, scopes, token_id, jti = resolved
if bool(getattr(user, "must_change_password", False)):
allow_key = (request.method.upper(), path.rstrip("/") if len(path) > 1 else path)
if allow_key not in _PASSWORD_CHANGE_ALLOW:
write_audit(
db,
action="auth.password_change_required",
actor_user_id=str(user.id),
actor_username=str(user.username),
method=request.method,
path=path,
status_code=403,
client_ip=_client_ip(request),
user_agent=str(request.headers.get("user-agent") or "")[:512],
detail={"auth_via": via},
)
return JSONResponse(
status_code=403,
content={"detail": "password_change_required"},
)
need = required_scope_for_request(request.method, path)
if need and not has_scope(scopes, need):
write_audit(
db,
action="auth.forbidden_scope",
actor_user_id=str(user.id),
actor_username=str(user.username),
method=request.method,
path=path,
status_code=403,
client_ip=_client_ip(request),
user_agent=str(request.headers.get("user-agent") or "")[:512],
detail={"required": need, "granted": sorted(scopes), "auth_via": via},
)
return JSONResponse(
status_code=403,
content={

View file

@ -153,19 +153,7 @@ def api_refresh(
detail={},
)
raise
user = out.get("user") or {}
write_audit(
db,
action="auth.refresh",
actor_user_id=str(user.get("id") or ""),
actor_username=str(user.get("username") or ""),
method="POST",
path="/v1/auth/refresh",
status_code=200,
client_ip=ip,
user_agent=ua,
detail={},
)
# Successful silent token refresh is not an operator action — skip audit.
return _token_response(response, request, out)

View file

@ -747,7 +747,10 @@ def list_audit_logs(
"api_tokens.get",
"auth.me",
"auth.sessions",
"auth.refresh",
"auth.unauthorized",
"auth.password_change_required",
"auth.forbidden_scope",
)
q = q.filter(~AuditLog.action.like("http.%"))
q = q.filter(~AuditLog.action.in_(noise_actions))