diff --git a/uds-auth/README.md b/uds-auth/README.md
index b37f0d2c..3be81dd5 100644
--- a/uds-auth/README.md
+++ b/uds-auth/README.md
@@ -40,13 +40,16 @@ outboundAllowedHosts: icenterapi.zte.com.cn,icentermsg.dt.zte.com.cn
 trustedHosts: ''               # empty = loopback Host only; proxies must set allowlist
 retainSkillCredentialsOnLogout: true
 skillCredentialTtlSeconds: 604800
+sessionIdleTimeoutHours: 0     # 0 = never auto sign out; 0.5–168h idle timeout; editable in Settings
 ```
 
 Durable state defaults to `~/.uds-auth/` (roles / owners / credentials / bridge / sessions / `config.runtime.json`; override with `UDS_AUTH_DATA_DIR`). Security toggles take effect on the next request after Settings save. Empty outbound allowlist denies all.
 
 ## Sessions
 
-- **Lifetime**: 30-minute idle timeout that slides on activity, 7-day absolute cap. The Desktop bridge token slides with its session.
+- **Lifetime**: by default (`sessionIdleTimeoutHours: 0`) sessions never sign out on their own — only a manual sign-out ends them, so running conversations and night-time scheduled tasks are never cut off. Setting 0.5–168 hours in Settings enables an idle timeout that slides on activity (HTTP requests and Desktop WS calls) with a 7-day absolute cap. The browser cookie and the Desktop bridge token slide with the session.
+- **UAC token check**: every 2 hours (and 1 minute after start) each QR session's UAC token is re-checked against the icenterapi department profile. A rejected token (401/403, business error code, employee not visible/mismatched) never signs out: the client shows a QR prompt, and the scan writes the new token into every live session of that account in place — no new session, no reload. Network errors, 5xx and malformed responses keep the previous verdict.
+- **Client probe**: `GET /uds-auth/session-status` (never slides the TTL) runs every minute and on window focus. It returns `alive` and `tokenValid`; a gone session signs the UI out, a rejected token opens the refresh QR once.
 - **Survives restarts**: the default in-memory store is persisted to `~/.uds-auth/sessions.json` and restored on Host start (emergency admins have no SSO re-login, so they depend on this).
   - Only the SHA-256 hash of each session token is stored; user data (may include the UAC token) is AES-256-GCM encrypted with the plugin key `.uds-auth-secret-key`.
   - Expired, undecryptable or tampered rows are dropped on load; disabled-account and emergency-password rotation checks still run on every request.
diff --git a/uds-auth/README.zh.md b/uds-auth/README.zh.md
index 635a3946..ac9794a0 100644
--- a/uds-auth/README.zh.md
+++ b/uds-auth/README.zh.md
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ outboundAllowedHosts: icenterapi.zte.com.cn,icentermsg.dt.zte.com.cn
 trustedHosts: ''               # 精确 Host 白名单；空=仅 loopback Host
 retainSkillCredentialsOnLogout: true
 skillCredentialTtlSeconds: 604800
+sessionIdleTimeoutHours: 0     # 0 = 不自动退出；0.5–168 = 闲置超时（小时）；设置页可改
 ```
 
 状态文件默认在 `~/.uds-auth/`（roles / owners / credentials / bridge / sessions / `config.runtime.json`）。可用环境变量 `UDS_AUTH_DATA_DIR` 覆盖。从安装目录升级时，若新数据目录为空且安装根仍有旧 `roles.json` 等，启动会一次性迁移（幂等、不覆盖已有目标文件）。公网或反代必须配置 `trustedHosts`。默认目录为**用户级**共享路径，不是按 DSH profile 隔离；单实例部署须知悉该边界。
@@ -51,7 +52,9 @@ skillCredentialTtlSeconds: 604800
 
 ## 会话
 
-- **有效期**：30 分钟无操作过期，有操作自动续期；从登录起最长 7 天。Desktop 的 bridge 令牌随会话一起续期。
+- **有效期**：默认（`sessionIdleTimeoutHours: 0`）不自动退出，只有手动退出才会结束会话，进行中的对话和夜间定时任务不会被打断。设置页填 0.5–168 小时可开启闲置超时：有操作（HTTP 请求及 Desktop 的 WS 调用）自动续期，最长 7 天。浏览器 cookie 和 Desktop 的 bridge 令牌随会话一起续期。
+- **UAC token 检查**：每 2 小时（启动 1 分钟后先查一次）用各扫码会话的 UAC token 调 icenterapi 查部门信息。token 被拒（401/403、业务错误码、查不到/工号不符）**不会退出**：客户端弹出扫码提示，扫码后新 token 原地写入该账号所有在线会话，不新建会话、不刷新页面。网络错误、5xx、返回格式异常保持上次结论不变。
+- **客户端探测**：每分钟及窗口重新获得焦点时调用 `GET /uds-auth/session-status`（不会续期），返回 `alive` 和 `tokenValid`：会话已不存在时界面自动退出；token 被拒时弹出一次刷新二维码。
 - **重启不掉线**：默认内存会话会写入 `~/.uds-auth/sessions.json`，Host / Harness 重启后自动恢复（应急账号没有 SSO 自动重登，尤其依赖这一点）。
   - 文件只保存会话令牌的 SHA-256 哈希，不保存令牌本身；用户信息（可能含 UAC token）用插件密钥 `.uds-auth-secret-key` 做 AES-256-GCM 加密。
   - 加载时丢弃已过期、解密失败或被篡改的记录；停用账号、应急口令轮换等检查仍在每次请求时执行。
diff --git a/uds-auth/config.default.yaml b/uds-auth/config.default.yaml
index f119935a..3d362d46 100644
--- a/uds-auth/config.default.yaml
+++ b/uds-auth/config.default.yaml
@@ -12,6 +12,9 @@ allowOpenRegistration: true
 allowRawAgentToken: false
 retainSkillCredentialsOnLogout: true
 skillCredentialTtlSeconds: 604800
+# Login session idle timeout in hours: 0 = never sign out automatically (manual sign-out only);
+# 0.5–168 = sign out after that long idle (slides while in use, 7-day absolute cap)
+sessionIdleTimeoutHours: 0
 outboundAllowedHosts: icenterapi.zte.com.cn,icentermsg.dt.zte.com.cn
 # Optional exact Host allowlist for /uds-auth writes; empty = Origin must match Host only
 trustedHosts: ''
diff --git a/uds-auth/docs/skill-auth-standard.zh.md b/uds-auth/docs/skill-auth-standard.zh.md
index 7a201a69..6b00945a 100644
--- a/uds-auth/docs/skill-auth-standard.zh.md
+++ b/uds-auth/docs/skill-auth-standard.zh.md
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ def load_uds_skill_auth():
 - 全局共享 token / 把 token 注入 `shellEnv`  
 - SKILL 教打印环境变量中的密钥  
 - 无白名单的开放代理  
-- 用 UI `sessionStore` 的 30min TTL 冒充 skill 长凭证  
+- 用 UI `sessionStore` 的闲置 TTL（`sessionIdleTimeoutHours`）冒充 skill 长凭证  
 - 业务 skill 硬编码插件源码路径（应用 `uds-skill-auth` skill）  
 
 ## 验收
diff --git a/uds-auth/lib/client.js b/uds-auth/lib/client.js
index a5740c92..bcd04214 100644
--- a/uds-auth/lib/client.js
+++ b/uds-auth/lib/client.js
@@ -37,6 +37,12 @@ window.__ModuleLoader__.load({
     "ui.deployConfig": "部署配置",
     "ui.userSearchUrl": "用户搜索 URL（token 校验）",
     "ui.workspaceRoot": "工作区根目录（空=$DSH_HOME/user-workspaces）",
+    "ui.sessionIdleTimeoutHours": "会话闲置超时（小时，0 = 不自动退出）",
+    "ui.tokenExpiredTitle": "UAC 登录已过期",
+    "ui.tokenExpiredHint": "请扫码刷新，不影响当前会话和定时任务",
+    "ui.tokenRefreshed": "UAC 登录已刷新",
+    "ui.sessionExpiredSignedOut": "登录已过期，已自动退出",
+    "ui.sessionIdleTimeoutHint": "默认 0：只有手动退出才会退出，定时任务和进行中的会话不受影响。大于 0 时，闲置超过该时长自动退出（范围 0.5–168）。UAC token 过期不会退出，只会提示扫码刷新。",
     "ui.allowRawAgentToken": "允许 Skill 获取原始 UDS token",
     "ui.allowRawAgentTokenHint": "开启后，具备当前任务 credentials scope 的本机 Skill 可获取工号和 token。只在业务确实需要原始 token 时开启。",
     "ui.saveConfig": "保存配置",
@@ -195,6 +201,12 @@ window.__ModuleLoader__.load({
     "ui.deployConfig": "Deploy config",
     "ui.userSearchUrl": "User search URL (token verify)",
     "ui.workspaceRoot": "Workspace root (empty=$DSH_HOME/user-workspaces)",
+    "ui.sessionIdleTimeoutHours": "Session idle timeout (hours, 0 = never sign out)",
+    "ui.tokenExpiredTitle": "UAC sign-in expired",
+    "ui.tokenExpiredHint": "Scan to refresh it — your sessions and scheduled tasks keep running",
+    "ui.tokenRefreshed": "UAC sign-in refreshed",
+    "ui.sessionExpiredSignedOut": "Session expired — you have been signed out",
+    "ui.sessionIdleTimeoutHint": "Default 0: only a manual sign-out ends the session; scheduled tasks and running conversations are unaffected. Above 0, sessions idle that long sign out (range 0.5–168). An expired UAC token never signs out — it only prompts a QR refresh.",
     "ui.allowRawAgentToken": "Allow Skills to read the raw UDS token",
     "ui.allowRawAgentTokenHint": "Enables local Skills with the current task credentials scope to read the employee number and token. Turn this on only when a workflow needs the raw token.",
     "ui.saveConfig": "Save config",
@@ -468,6 +480,9 @@ window.__ModuleLoader__.load({
       '.uds-auth-avatar{display:inline-flex;align-items:center;justify-content:center;width:16px;height:16px;border-radius:50%;flex:none;font-size:10px;line-height:1;color:var(--dsw-alias-label-secondary,#646a73);background:transparent;border:none}',
       '.uds-auth-badge-unauth .uds-auth-avatar{background:var(--dsw-alias-bg-module-platform,rgba(242,243,245,1));color:var(--dsw-alias-label-tertiary,#8f959e)}',
       '.uds-auth-badge-label{overflow:hidden;text-overflow:ellipsis;white-space:nowrap}',
+      '.uds-auth-badge.has-token-warning::after{content:"";flex:none;width:6px;height:6px;margin-left:6px;border-radius:50%;background:var(--dsw-alias-state-warning-primary,#e37318)}',
+      '.uds-auth-token-warn{margin:8px 0 4px;padding:8px 10px;border-radius:6px;background:rgba(227,115,24,.08);font-size:12px;line-height:1.5;color:var(--dsw-alias-label-secondary,#646a73)}',
+      '.uds-auth-token-warn strong{display:block;color:var(--dsw-alias-state-warning-primary,#e37318);font-weight:500}',
       '.uds-auth-role{font-size:10px;padding:1px 6px;border-radius:10px;font-weight:600;flex-shrink:0}',
       '.uds-auth-role-super_admin{background:rgba(213,73,65,.12);color:var(--dsw-alias-state-error-primary,#d54941)}',
       '.uds-auth-role-admin{background:rgba(217,119,6,.12);color:var(--dsw-alias-state-warn-primary,#d97706)}',
@@ -973,6 +988,53 @@ window.__ModuleLoader__.load({
       return document.documentElement.getAttribute('data-uds-logged-in') === '1'
     }
 
+    /** Server error codes / messages meaning the caller's local session is gone. */
+    const SESSION_GONE_CODES = new Set(['session_revoked', 'login_required_session', 'not_logged_in'])
+    const SESSION_GONE_MESSAGES = new Set(['会话已失效，请重新登录', 'Session expired; please sign in again'])
+
+    function looksLikeSessionGone(error) {
+      if (!error || typeof error !== 'object') return false
+      const code = error.details?.udsError || error.data?.error || error.error
+      return SESSION_GONE_CODES.has(String(code || ''))
+        || SESSION_GONE_MESSAGES.has(String(error.message || '').trim())
+    }
+
+    let _sessionCheckInFlight = null
+    /**
+     * Ask the server whether our session is still alive. /uds-auth/session-status never
+     * slides the idle TTL, so the idle watcher cannot keep an unattended tab signed in.
+     * Only a definite alive=false signs out — network/server trouble never does.
+     */
+    function checkSessionAlive() {
+      if (!isLoggedInInUi()) return Promise.resolve(true)
+      if (_sessionCheckInFlight) return _sessionCheckInFlight
+      _sessionCheckInFlight = (async () => {
+        try {
+          const res = await fetch('/uds-auth/session-status', {
+            credentials: 'include',
+            cache: 'no-store',
+            headers: bridgeAuthHeaders(),
+          })
+          if (!res.ok) return true
+          const data = await res.json().catch(() => null)
+          if (data && data.alive === false && isLoggedInInUi()) {
+            window.dispatchEvent(new Event('uds-auth-expired'))
+            return false
+          }
+          // UAC token rejected → prompt a QR refresh; the session itself stays.
+          if (data && data.alive && typeof data.tokenValid === 'boolean') {
+            window.dispatchEvent(new Event(data.tokenValid ? 'uds-auth-token-ok' : 'uds-auth-token-expired'))
+          }
+          return true
+        } catch {
+          return true
+        } finally {
+          _sessionCheckInFlight = null
+        }
+      })()
+      return _sessionCheckInFlight
+    }
+
     function clearSessionIfAnonymous(sessions) {
       // Until /api/me confirms login, treat as anonymous (AuthBadge refreshes me on mount).
       if (isLoggedInInUi()) return
@@ -1114,6 +1176,7 @@ function reloadAfterLogin() {
         : { ...baseHeaders, ...optHeaders }
       const res = await fetch(url, { credentials: 'include', ...options, headers })
       const data = await res.json().catch(() => ({}))
+      if (res.status === 401) void checkSessionAlive()
       if (!res.ok) {
         const err = new Error(data.message || data.error || res.statusText || t('err.request_failed'))
         err.status = res.status
@@ -1316,6 +1379,7 @@ function reloadAfterLogin() {
         loginSystemCode: '',
         originSystemCode: '',
         workspaceRoot: '',
+        sessionIdleTimeoutHours: 0,
         allowRawAgentToken: false,
       })
       const [fallbackEnabled, setFallbackEnabled] = useState(false)
@@ -1439,6 +1503,20 @@ function reloadAfterLogin() {
           field('loginSystemCode', 'loginSystemCode'),
           field('originSystemCode', 'originSystemCode'),
           field('workspaceRoot', t('ui.workspaceRoot')),
+          h('div', { className: 'uds-auth-settings-field' },
+            h('label', { htmlFor: 'uds-auth-sessionIdleTimeoutHours' }, t('ui.sessionIdleTimeoutHours')),
+            h('input', {
+              id: 'uds-auth-sessionIdleTimeoutHours',
+              type: 'number',
+              min: 0,
+              max: 168,
+              step: 0.5,
+              value: form.sessionIdleTimeoutHours ?? '',
+              disabled: !canSettings || busy,
+              onChange: (e) => setForm((prev) => ({ ...prev, sessionIdleTimeoutHours: e.target.value })),
+            }),
+          ),
+          h('p', { className: 'uds-auth-settings-intro' }, t('ui.sessionIdleTimeoutHint')),
           h('label', { className: 'uds-auth-settings-toggle' },
             h('input', {
               type: 'checkbox',
@@ -1542,6 +1620,12 @@ function reloadAfterLogin() {
       const [open, setOpen] = useState(false)
       const [anchor, setAnchor] = useState(null)
       const [user, setUser] = useState(null)
+      const [sessionExpired, setSessionExpired] = useState(false)
+      const [tokenExpired, setTokenExpired] = useState(false)
+      const tokenExpiredRef = useRef(false)
+      const [tokenNotice, setTokenNotice] = useState('')
+      /** QR in refresh mode: a signed-in user re-scans to renew the UAC token in place. */
+      const refreshModeRef = useRef(false)
       
 
       const [loading, setLoading] = useState(false)
@@ -1682,8 +1766,9 @@ function reloadAfterLogin() {
         setQrStatus(t('ui.qrGenerating'))
         setQrImg('')
         // Me check in background — never block QR paint on /api/me.
+        const refreshing = refreshModeRef.current
         void refreshUser().then((loggedIn) => {
-          if (!loggedIn) return
+          if (!loggedIn || refreshing) return
           stopQr()
           setQrStatus('')
           setQrImg('')
@@ -1692,7 +1777,7 @@ function reloadAfterLogin() {
         try {
           const started = await fetchJson('/uds-auth/qr-start')
           // Already signed in while QR was starting — drop the code.
-          if (document.documentElement.getAttribute('data-uds-logged-in') === '1') {
+          if (!refreshing && document.documentElement.getAttribute('data-uds-logged-in') === '1') {
             stopQr()
             setQrStatus('')
             setQrImg('')
@@ -1720,7 +1805,7 @@ function reloadAfterLogin() {
               const result = await fetchJson('/uds-auth/qr-proxy', {
                 method: 'POST',
                 headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', 'X-UDS-QR-Binding': browserBinding },
-                body: JSON.stringify({ qrCodeKey, qrCodeValue }),
+                body: JSON.stringify(refreshing ? { qrCodeKey, qrCodeValue, refresh: true } : { qrCodeKey, qrCodeValue }),
               })
               if (qrRef.current.key !== qrCodeKey) return
               const codeCode = result.code?.code || ''
@@ -1730,6 +1815,14 @@ function reloadAfterLogin() {
                 setQrExpired(false)
                 setQrFailed(false)
                 const auth = result.auth
+                if (auth?.success && auth.refreshed) {
+                  // Token renewed in place — no new session, no reload.
+                  tokenExpiredRef.current = false
+                  setTokenExpired(false)
+                  setTokenNotice(t('ui.tokenRefreshed'))
+                  setTimeout(() => { setOpen(false); setTokenNotice('') }, 1500)
+                  return
+                }
                 if (!auth?.success || !auth?.bridge?.token) {
                   setQrStatus(t('ui.loginFailed'))
                   return
@@ -1813,6 +1906,76 @@ function reloadAfterLogin() {
         }
       }, [localKey, refreshUser])
 
+      /** Drop local auth state. `expired`: server already dropped the session — skip /api/logout. */
+      const signOut = useCallback(async ({ expired = false } = {}) => {
+        if (!expired) {
+          try { await fetchJson('/uds-auth/api/logout', { method: 'POST' }) } catch { /* ignore */ }
+        }
+        clearAuthCookies()
+        clearBridge()
+        try { window.__udsAuthWsAuthedOnce = false } catch { /* ignore */ }
+        try { window.__udsAuthResetEmp = null } catch { /* ignore */ }
+        setUser(null)
+        tokenExpiredRef.current = false
+        setTokenExpired(false)
+        setSessionExpired(expired)
+        // Expired: open the panel once so the reason and a fresh QR are right there.
+        setOpen(expired)
+        document.documentElement.setAttribute('data-uds-logged-in', '0')
+        document.documentElement.setAttribute('data-uds-can-settings', '0')
+        document.documentElement.setAttribute('data-uds-can-create-ws', '0')
+        clearSessionIfAnonymous(window.__udsAuthSessions)
+        window.dispatchEvent(new Event('uds-auth-changed'))
+        try { softReconnectAuth({ force: true }) } catch { /* ignore */ }
+      }, [])
+
+      useEffect(() => {
+        const onExpired = () => { if (isLoggedInInUi()) void signOut({ expired: true }) }
+        window.addEventListener('uds-auth-expired', onExpired)
+        return () => window.removeEventListener('uds-auth-expired', onExpired)
+      }, [signOut])
+
+      useEffect(() => {
+        if (user) setSessionExpired(false)
+      }, [user])
+
+      // UAC token expired: open the panel once with a refresh QR. The session is untouched.
+      useEffect(() => {
+        const onTokenExpired = () => {
+          if (tokenExpiredRef.current || !isLoggedInInUi()) return
+          tokenExpiredRef.current = true
+          setTokenExpired(true)
+          setOpen(true)
+        }
+        const onTokenOk = () => {
+          tokenExpiredRef.current = false
+          setTokenExpired(false)
+        }
+        window.addEventListener('uds-auth-token-expired', onTokenExpired)
+        window.addEventListener('uds-auth-token-ok', onTokenOk)
+        return () => {
+          window.removeEventListener('uds-auth-token-expired', onTokenExpired)
+          window.removeEventListener('uds-auth-token-ok', onTokenOk)
+        }
+      }, [])
+
+      // Idle watcher: notice server-side idle expiry within a minute (and right away when
+      // the window comes back), instead of surfacing "please sign in again" on every call.
+      useEffect(() => {
+        if (!user) return undefined
+        const check = () => { void checkSessionAlive() }
+        const onVisible = () => { if (document.visibilityState === 'visible') check() }
+        const timer = setInterval(check, 60_000)
+        check()
+        window.addEventListener('focus', check)
+        document.addEventListener('visibilitychange', onVisible)
+        return () => {
+          clearInterval(timer)
+          window.removeEventListener('focus', check)
+          document.removeEventListener('visibilitychange', onVisible)
+        }
+      }, [user])
+
       useEffect(() => {
         // Restore session after login reload / refresh — cookie alone does not set the badge.
         // (Previously me ran only inside startQr, so a click on「未登录」was required.)
@@ -1842,10 +2005,12 @@ function reloadAfterLogin() {
         return () => { cancelled = true }
       }, [open, user])
 
+      refreshModeRef.current = !!(user && tokenExpired)
       useEffect(() => {
-        if (open && !user && loginMode === 'qr') startQr()
-        if (!open || loginMode !== 'qr') stopQr()
-      }, [open, user, loginMode, startQr, stopQr])
+        const wantQr = open && loginMode === 'qr' && (!user || tokenExpired)
+        if (wantQr) startQr()
+        else stopQr()
+      }, [open, user, tokenExpired, loginMode, startQr, stopQr])
 
       useLayoutEffect(() => {
         if (!open) { setAnchor(null); return undefined }
@@ -1882,6 +2047,49 @@ function reloadAfterLogin() {
         : (qrStatus || t('ui.qrGenerateFailed'))
       const qrOverlayHint = t('ui.qrExpiredHint')
 
+      const renderQr = () => (
+        h('div', { className: 'uds-auth-qr' },
+          (qrImg || qrOverlay) && h('div', {
+            className: 'uds-auth-qr-frame' + (qrOverlay ? ' is-expired' : ''),
+          },
+            qrImg ? h('img', { src: qrImg, alt: 'QR' }) : h('div', {
+              style: {
+                width: '100%',
+                height: '100%',
+                background: 'var(--dsw-alias-bg-module-platform, #f4f5f7)',
+              },
+            }),
+            qrOverlay && h('div', { className: 'uds-auth-qr-overlay' },
+              h('div', { className: 'uds-auth-qr-overlay-title' }, qrOverlayTitle),
+              h('div', { className: 'uds-auth-qr-overlay-hint' }, qrOverlayHint),
+              h('button', {
+                type: 'button',
+                className: 'uds-auth-qr-refresh',
+                'aria-label': t('ui.refreshQr'),
+                title: t('ui.refreshQr'),
+                onClick: startQr,
+              },
+                h('svg', {
+                  width: 22,
+                  height: 22,
+                  viewBox: '0 0 24 24',
+                  fill: 'none',
+                  stroke: 'currentColor',
+                  strokeWidth: 2.4,
+                  strokeLinecap: 'round',
+                  strokeLinejoin: 'round',
+                  'aria-hidden': 'true',
+                },
+                  h('path', { d: 'M21 12a9 9 0 1 1-2.6-6.2' }),
+                  h('polyline', { points: '21 3 21 9 15 9' }),
+                ),
+              ),
+            ),
+          ),
+          !qrOverlay && h('div', { className: 'uds-auth-qr-status' }, qrStatus || t('ui.loading')),
+        )
+      )
+
       return h('div', {
         ref: rootRef,
         className: 'uds-auth-host' + (wide ? '' : ' is-rail'),
@@ -1901,49 +2109,11 @@ function reloadAfterLogin() {
         ? (loginMode === 'qr'
           ? h(React.Fragment, null,
             h('div', { className: 'uds-auth-info' },
-              h('div', { className: 'uds-auth-info-name' }, qrOverlay ? qrOverlayTitle : t('ui.notLoggedIn')),
+              h('div', { className: 'uds-auth-info-name' },
+                qrOverlay ? qrOverlayTitle : (sessionExpired ? t('ui.sessionExpiredSignedOut') : t('ui.notLoggedIn'))),
               h('div', { className: 'uds-auth-info-detail' }, qrOverlay ? qrOverlayHint : t('ui.pleaseScan')),
             ),
-            h('div', { className: 'uds-auth-qr' },
-              (qrImg || qrOverlay) && h('div', {
-                className: 'uds-auth-qr-frame' + (qrOverlay ? ' is-expired' : ''),
-              },
-                qrImg ? h('img', { src: qrImg, alt: 'QR' }) : h('div', {
-                  style: {
-                    width: '100%',
-                    height: '100%',
-                    background: 'var(--dsw-alias-bg-module-platform, #f4f5f7)',
-                  },
-                }),
-                qrOverlay && h('div', { className: 'uds-auth-qr-overlay' },
-                  h('div', { className: 'uds-auth-qr-overlay-title' }, qrOverlayTitle),
-                  h('div', { className: 'uds-auth-qr-overlay-hint' }, qrOverlayHint),
-                  h('button', {
-                    type: 'button',
-                    className: 'uds-auth-qr-refresh',
-                    'aria-label': t('ui.refreshQr'),
-                    title: t('ui.refreshQr'),
-                    onClick: startQr,
-                  },
-                    h('svg', {
-                      width: 22,
-                      height: 22,
-                      viewBox: '0 0 24 24',
-                      fill: 'none',
-                      stroke: 'currentColor',
-                      strokeWidth: 2.4,
-                      strokeLinecap: 'round',
-                      strokeLinejoin: 'round',
-                      'aria-hidden': 'true',
-                    },
-                      h('path', { d: 'M21 12a9 9 0 1 1-2.6-6.2' }),
-                      h('polyline', { points: '21 3 21 9 15 9' }),
-                    ),
-                  ),
-                ),
-              ),
-              !qrOverlay && h('div', { className: 'uds-auth-qr-status' }, qrStatus || t('ui.loading')),
-            ),
+            renderQr(),
             // U01: emergency password always discoverable — disabled state is shown, not hidden.
             // Local sealed-box unlock stays hidden unless Host actually has a box configured.
             h('button', {
@@ -2039,32 +2209,26 @@ function reloadAfterLogin() {
             h('div', { className: 'uds-auth-info-detail' }, h('span', { className: 'uds-auth-info-detail-label' }, t('ui.role')), label || user.role || '-'),
             user.department && h('div', { className: 'uds-auth-info-detail' }, h('span', { className: 'uds-auth-info-detail-label' }, t('ui.department')), user.department),
           ),
+          tokenNotice && h('div', { className: 'uds-auth-qr-status', role: 'status' }, tokenNotice),
+          tokenExpired && h(React.Fragment, null,
+            h('div', { className: 'uds-auth-token-warn', role: 'status' },
+              h('strong', null, t('ui.tokenExpiredTitle')),
+              t('ui.tokenExpiredHint'),
+            ),
+            renderQr(),
+          ),
           h('button', {
             type: 'button', className: 'uds-auth-btn uds-auth-btn-danger',
-            onClick: async () => {
-              try { await fetchJson('/uds-auth/api/logout', { method: 'POST' }) } catch { /* ignore */ }
-              clearAuthCookies()
-              clearBridge()
-              try { window.__udsAuthWsAuthedOnce = false } catch { /* ignore */ }
-              try { window.__udsAuthResetEmp = null } catch { /* ignore */ }
-              setUser(null)
-              setOpen(false)
-              document.documentElement.setAttribute('data-uds-logged-in', '0')
-              document.documentElement.setAttribute('data-uds-can-settings', '0')
-              document.documentElement.setAttribute('data-uds-can-create-ws', '0')
-              clearSessionIfAnonymous(window.__udsAuthSessions)
-              window.dispatchEvent(new Event('uds-auth-changed'))
-              try { softReconnectAuth({ force: true }) } catch { /* ignore */ }
-            },
+            onClick: () => signOut(),
           }, t('ui.logout')),
         ),
       ),
       h('button', {
         type: 'button',
-        className: 'uds-auth-badge' + (user ? '' : ' uds-auth-badge-unauth'),
+        className: 'uds-auth-badge' + (user ? '' : ' uds-auth-badge-unauth') + (user && tokenExpired ? ' has-token-warning' : ''),
         'aria-expanded': open,
         'aria-label': displayName || 'UAC',
-        title: displayName || 'UAC',
+        title: user && tokenExpired ? t('ui.tokenExpiredTitle') : (displayName || 'UAC'),
         onClick: () => setOpen((v) => !v),
       },
       h('span', { className: 'uds-auth-badge-label' }, displayName),
@@ -2197,7 +2361,16 @@ function reloadAfterLogin() {
             rpc.__udsAuthListGate = true
             const origCall = rpc.call.bind(rpc)
             rpc.call = async function udsAuthRpcCall(channel, endpoint, payload, signal) {
-              const result = await origCall(channel, endpoint, payload, signal)
+              let result
+              try {
+                result = await origCall(channel, endpoint, payload, signal)
+              } catch (err) {
+                if (looksLikeSessionGone(err)) void checkSessionAlive()
+                throw err
+              }
+              if (result && result.ok === false && looksLikeSessionGone(result.error)) {
+                void checkSessionAlive()
+              }
               if (!isLoggedInInUi()) {
               if (channel === '/api') {
                 if (endpoint === 'session/list') return { ok: true, value: { items: [] } }
diff --git a/uds-auth/lib/config.js b/uds-auth/lib/config.js
index 004ea644..db506962 100644
--- a/uds-auth/lib/config.js
+++ b/uds-auth/lib/config.js
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ const DEFAULT_CONFIG = {
   originSystemCode: '',
   retainSkillCredentialsOnLogout: true,
   skillCredentialTtlSeconds: 7 * 24 * 60 * 60,
+  sessionIdleTimeoutHours: 0,
   outboundAllowedHosts: 'icenterapi.zte.com.cn,icentermsg.dt.zte.com.cn',
   initialAdminEmpNo: '',
   allowOpenRegistration: true,
@@ -44,7 +45,8 @@ const INTERNAL = {
     storeType: 'memory',
     redisUrl: 'redis://localhost:6379',
     cookieName: 'UDS_SESSION',
-    cookieMaxAge: 1800000,
+    // Default only; the live idle TTL comes from sessionIdleTimeoutHours (see lib/index.js).
+    cookieMaxAge: 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000,
   },
 }
 
diff --git a/uds-auth/lib/dsh-acl.js b/uds-auth/lib/dsh-acl.js
index c863c07b..9be69daf 100644
--- a/uds-auth/lib/dsh-acl.js
+++ b/uds-auth/lib/dsh-acl.js
@@ -642,6 +642,7 @@ export function installDshAcl(ctx, {
   getSessionStore,
   ensureUserWorkspace,
   getWorkspaceRegistry,
+  onPrincipalActive,
 }) {
   const disposers = []
   const resolveRolesStore = () => {
@@ -747,6 +748,11 @@ export function installDshAcl(ctx, {
         throwForbidden('fallback_rotated')
       }
     }
+    // Desktop works over the remote.mux WS, which never passes the HTTP auth middleware;
+    // report activity so the idle TTL slides instead of expiring mid-use.
+    if (sessionRow && typeof onPrincipalActive === 'function') {
+      try { onPrincipalActive(sessionRow.sessionId, emp) } catch { /* ignore */ }
+    }
   }
 
   // Stamp owner on session create
diff --git a/uds-auth/lib/i18n.js b/uds-auth/lib/i18n.js
index 5821c4dd..3a5d3585 100644
--- a/uds-auth/lib/i18n.js
+++ b/uds-auth/lib/i18n.js
@@ -30,6 +30,12 @@ export const MESSAGES = {
     'ui.deployConfig': '部署配置',
     'ui.userSearchUrl': '用户搜索 URL（token 校验）',
     'ui.workspaceRoot': '工作区根目录（空=$DSH_HOME/user-workspaces）',
+    'ui.sessionIdleTimeoutHours': '会话闲置超时（小时，0 = 不自动退出）',
+    'ui.tokenExpiredTitle': 'UAC 登录已过期',
+    'ui.tokenExpiredHint': '请扫码刷新，不影响当前会话和定时任务',
+    'ui.tokenRefreshed': 'UAC 登录已刷新',
+    'ui.sessionExpiredSignedOut': '登录已过期，已自动退出',
+    'ui.sessionIdleTimeoutHint': '默认 0：只有手动退出才会退出，定时任务和进行中的会话不受影响。大于 0 时，闲置超过该时长自动退出（范围 0.5–168）。UAC token 过期不会退出，只会提示扫码刷新。',
     'ui.allowRawAgentToken': '允许 Skill 获取原始 UDS token',
     'ui.allowRawAgentTokenHint': '开启后，具备当前任务 credentials scope 的本机 Skill 可获取工号和 token。只在业务确实需要原始 token 时开启。',
     'ui.saveConfig': '保存配置',
@@ -166,6 +172,8 @@ export const MESSAGES = {
     'err.invalid_user_search_url': 'userSearchUrl 必须是 https URL',
     'err.invalid_workspace_root': 'workspaceRoot 必须是绝对路径',
     'err.invalid_ttl': 'TTL 超出允许范围',
+    'err.invalid_session_idle_timeout': '会话闲置超时需为 0（不自动退出）或 0.5–168 小时',
+    'err.token_refresh_emp_mismatch': '请用当前登录账号 {empNo} 扫码刷新（本次扫码账号：{scanned}）',
     'err.invalid_outbound_host': 'outbound 白名单 host 格式无效',
     'err.bootstrap_required': '系统尚未初始化管理员（当前扫码工号 {empNo}）。请设置环境变量 UDS_AUTH_INITIAL_ADMIN={empNo} 后重启 Harness；或先用「应急账号登录」进入，在设置中添加用户',
     'err.registration_closed': '未开放自动注册，请联系管理员',
@@ -228,6 +236,12 @@ export const MESSAGES = {
     'ui.deployConfig': 'Deploy config',
     'ui.userSearchUrl': 'User search URL (token verify)',
     'ui.workspaceRoot': 'Workspace root (empty=$DSH_HOME/user-workspaces)',
+    'ui.sessionIdleTimeoutHours': 'Session idle timeout (hours, 0 = never sign out)',
+    'ui.tokenExpiredTitle': 'UAC sign-in expired',
+    'ui.tokenExpiredHint': 'Scan to refresh it — your sessions and scheduled tasks keep running',
+    'ui.tokenRefreshed': 'UAC sign-in refreshed',
+    'ui.sessionExpiredSignedOut': 'Session expired — you have been signed out',
+    'ui.sessionIdleTimeoutHint': 'Default 0: only a manual sign-out ends the session; scheduled tasks and running conversations are unaffected. Above 0, sessions idle that long sign out (range 0.5–168). An expired UAC token never signs out — it only prompts a QR refresh.',
     'ui.allowRawAgentToken': 'Allow Skills to read the raw UDS token',
     'ui.allowRawAgentTokenHint': 'Enables local Skills with the current task credentials scope to read the employee number and token. Turn this on only when a workflow needs the raw token.',
     'ui.saveConfig': 'Save config',
@@ -359,6 +373,8 @@ export const MESSAGES = {
     'err.invalid_user_search_url': 'userSearchUrl must be an https URL',
     'err.invalid_workspace_root': 'workspaceRoot must be an absolute path',
     'err.invalid_ttl': 'TTL out of allowed range',
+    'err.invalid_session_idle_timeout': 'Session idle timeout must be 0 (never sign out) or 0.5–168 hours',
+    'err.token_refresh_emp_mismatch': 'Scan with the signed-in account {empNo} to refresh (scanned: {scanned})',
     'err.invalid_outbound_host': 'Invalid outbound host entry',
     'err.bootstrap_required': 'Admin not initialized (scanned employee no. {empNo}). Set UDS_AUTH_INITIAL_ADMIN={empNo} and restart Harness, or sign in with the emergency account and add users in Settings',
     'err.registration_closed': 'Open registration is disabled; contact an admin',
diff --git a/uds-auth/lib/index.js b/uds-auth/lib/index.js
index ad5c0ad5..c3305622 100644
--- a/uds-auth/lib/index.js
+++ b/uds-auth/lib/index.js
@@ -101,6 +101,8 @@ const CONFIG_DEFAULTS = {
   retainSkillCredentialsOnLogout: true,
   /** skill 凭证 TTL（秒），默认 7 天 */
   skillCredentialTtlSeconds: 7 * 24 * 60 * 60,
+  /** 登录会话闲置超时（小时）；0 = 不自动退出（默认，只能手动退出）。>0 时活跃自动续期、最长 7 天 */
+  sessionIdleTimeoutHours: 0,
   /** outbound 白名单 host（逗号分隔或数组） */
   outboundAllowedHosts: 'icenterapi.zte.com.cn,icentermsg.dt.zte.com.cn',
   /** SEC-05: raw /agent-credentials token response off by default */
@@ -122,12 +124,28 @@ const INTERNAL = {
   session: {
     storeType: 'memory',        // 单实例足够；多实例需共享 store，不可静默切 memory
     redisUrl: 'redis://localhost:6379',
-    cookieMaxAge: 1800000,      // 30min idle TTL
+    /** Idle TTL (ms), read live from sessionIdleTimeoutHours so settings apply without restart. */
+    get cookieMaxAge() { return sessionIdleTimeoutMs(_currentConfig?.sessionIdleTimeoutHours) },
     slidingExpiration: true,
     slidingInterval: 300000,
   },
 }
 
+const SESSION_IDLE_MIN_HOURS = 0.5
+const SESSION_IDLE_MAX_HOURS = 7 * 24
+/** sessionIdleTimeoutHours = 0: sessions never expire on their own (10 years, still sliding). */
+const SESSION_NO_EXPIRY_MS = 10 * 365 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000
+
+function isValidSessionIdleHours(n) {
+  return Number.isFinite(n) && (n === 0 || (n >= SESSION_IDLE_MIN_HOURS && n <= SESSION_IDLE_MAX_HOURS))
+}
+
+function sessionIdleTimeoutMs(hours) {
+  const n = hours === '' || hours == null ? NaN : Number(hours)
+  const h = isValidSessionIdleHours(n) ? n : CONFIG_DEFAULTS.sessionIdleTimeoutHours
+  return h === 0 ? SESSION_NO_EXPIRY_MS : Math.round(h * 60 * 60 * 1000)
+}
+
 // 懒加载 schemastery Config schema（只在需要注册 DSH 设置面板时用）
 // 用 createRequire 因为 schemastery 由 DSH host 运行时提供，不在我们的 package 里
 let _ConfigSchema = null
@@ -144,6 +162,7 @@ function loadConfigSchemaAndSettings(ctx) {
       workspaceRoot: z.string().default(CONFIG_DEFAULTS.workspaceRoot),
       retainSkillCredentialsOnLogout: z.boolean().default(CONFIG_DEFAULTS.retainSkillCredentialsOnLogout),
       skillCredentialTtlSeconds: z.number().default(CONFIG_DEFAULTS.skillCredentialTtlSeconds),
+      sessionIdleTimeoutHours: z.number().default(CONFIG_DEFAULTS.sessionIdleTimeoutHours),
       outboundAllowedHosts: z.string().default(CONFIG_DEFAULTS.outboundAllowedHosts),
       initialAdminEmpNo: z.string().default(CONFIG_DEFAULTS.initialAdminEmpNo),
       allowOpenRegistration: z.boolean().default(CONFIG_DEFAULTS.allowOpenRegistration),
@@ -197,6 +216,8 @@ let _agentAuthHandlers = null
 let _taskCapabilities = null
 /** @type {SessionBridgeStore | null} */
 let _sessionBridge = null
+/** @type {import('./uds/session-revalidation.js').UdsTokenMonitor | null} */
+let _tokenMonitor = null
 /** SEC-20: false until init completes; routes return 503 when unready. */
 let _pluginReady = false
 let _pluginReadyError = null
@@ -222,6 +243,7 @@ function mintBridge(empNo, kind = 'fallback', ssoToken, bearer) {
       kind,
       ssoToken,
       token: bearer || undefined,
+      ttlMs: INTERNAL.session.cookieMaxAge,
     })
     return {
       empNo: minted.empNo,
@@ -235,6 +257,24 @@ function mintBridge(empNo, kind = 'fallback', ssoToken, bearer) {
   }
 }
 
+/** sessionId → last slide time; throttles WS-driven idle-TTL sliding. */
+const _lastSlideAt = new Map()
+
+/** Slide session + Desktop bridge idle TTL on WS/RPC activity (no HTTP request involved). */
+function slideActiveSession(sessionId, empNo) {
+  const now = Date.now()
+  if (now - (_lastSlideAt.get(sessionId) || 0) < INTERNAL.session.slidingInterval) return
+  _lastSlideAt.set(sessionId, now)
+  if (_lastSlideAt.size > 5000) {
+    for (const [sid, at] of _lastSlideAt) {
+      if (now - at >= INTERNAL.session.slidingInterval) _lastSlideAt.delete(sid)
+    }
+  }
+  const ttl = Math.floor(INTERNAL.session.cookieMaxAge / 1000)
+  Promise.resolve(_sessionStore?.touch(sessionId, ttl)).catch(() => {})
+  try { _sessionBridge?.touchEmpNo(empNo, INTERNAL.session.cookieMaxAge) } catch { /* ignore */ }
+}
+
 /** Create local session + bridge sharing the same bearer. */
 async function mintLoginSession(empNo, userContext, kind = 'uds', ssoToken) {
   const live = () => !_rolesStore?.isDisabled(empNo)
@@ -366,6 +406,8 @@ async function handleQRProxy(req, res) {
   try {
     let parsedBody = {}
     try { parsedBody = JSON.parse(body) } catch { parsedBody = {} }
+    // Token refresh for a signed-in user: kept local, never forwarded upstream.
+    const refreshToken = parsedBody.refresh === true
     // A04: peek only — do not consume until upstream confirms login.
     const peeked = peekQrChallenge(parsedBody.qrCodeKey, parsedBody.qrCodeValue, req.headers['x-uds-qr-binding'])
     if (!peeked.ok) {
@@ -455,6 +497,18 @@ async function handleQRProxy(req, res) {
             return sendErr(res, req, status, code, { host: hostOfUrl(_currentConfig.userSearchUrl), ...vars })
           }
           const id = profile.empNo || credentials.empNo
+          if (refreshToken) {
+            // Refresh in place: no new session, no reload — conversations and cron continue.
+            const caller = await peekCallerSession(req)
+            if (!caller) return sendErr(res, req, 401, 'not_logged_in')
+            if (String(caller.empNo) !== String(id)) {
+              return sendErr(res, req, 409, 'token_refresh_emp_mismatch', { empNo: caller.empNo, scanned: id })
+            }
+            const refreshed = await refreshSessionToken(id, credentials.token, profile)
+            _logger?.info?.('[uds-auth] UAC token refreshed for %s (%d session(s))', id, refreshed)
+            return sendJSON(res, 200, { code: { code: '0000' }, bo: { code: '0000' },
+              auth: { success: true, refreshed: true, empNo: id } })
+          }
           const role = await _authMiddleware.resolveRoleOnLogin(id)
           const now = new Date().toISOString()
           const userContext = { empNo: id, userId: id, username: profile.username || id,
@@ -549,6 +603,58 @@ async function handleQRCode(req, res) {
   }
 }
 
+/** The caller's live local session, without sliding its TTL. */
+async function peekCallerSession(req) {
+  try {
+    const extracted = await extractSessionBearerAsync(req, {
+      sessionBridge: _sessionBridge,
+      isLiveBearer: async (b) => !!(await _sessionStore?.getByBearer(b)),
+    })
+    if (!extracted?.bearer) return null
+    const session = await _sessionStore.getByBearer(extracted.bearer)
+    if (!session) return null
+    if (extracted.bridgeEmpNo && String(extracted.bridgeEmpNo) !== String(session.empNo)) return null
+    if (_rolesStore?.isDisabled?.(session.empNo)) return null
+    return session
+  } catch {
+    return null
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Write a freshly verified UAC token into every live QR session of the account.
+ * Sessions, bridges and running conversations stay as they are.
+ */
+async function refreshSessionToken(empNo, token, profile) {
+  const ids = (await _sessionStore.listUdsSessionsForValidation())
+    .filter((s) => String(s.empNo) === String(empNo))
+    .map((s) => s.sessionId)
+  const now = new Date().toISOString()
+  const patch = {
+    token,
+    tokenRefreshedAt: now,
+    ...(profile?.department ? { department: profile.department } : {}),
+    ...(profile?.organization ? { organization: profile.organization } : {}),
+  }
+  for (const id of ids) await _sessionStore.updateUserData(id, patch)
+  try { _skillCredentials?.set(empNo, token) } catch { /* cache is best-effort */ }
+  _tokenMonitor?.markRefreshed(ids)
+  return ids.length
+}
+
+/** { alive, empNo, tokenValid } for the caller's session without touching it (see route comment). */
+async function handleSessionStatus(req, res) {
+  const session = await peekCallerSession(req)
+  res.setHeader('Cache-Control', 'no-store')
+  return sendJSON(res, 200, {
+    ok: true,
+    alive: !!session,
+    empNo: session?.empNo || null,
+    // false → UAC token rejected; client prompts a QR scan that refreshes it in place.
+    tokenValid: session ? !_tokenMonitor?.isTokenRejected(session.sessionId) : null,
+  })
+}
+
 // 客户端 config.get —— RPC 在 web 端以 HTTP 方式请求 /uds-auth/config.get
 async function handleConfigGet(req, res) {
   const c = _currentConfig || {}
@@ -567,6 +673,7 @@ async function handleConfigGet(req, res) {
       workspaceRoot: c.workspaceRoot,
       retainSkillCredentialsOnLogout: c.retainSkillCredentialsOnLogout !== false,
       skillCredentialTtlSeconds: c.skillCredentialTtlSeconds,
+      sessionIdleTimeoutHours: c.sessionIdleTimeoutHours ?? CONFIG_DEFAULTS.sessionIdleTimeoutHours,
       outboundAllowedHosts: c.outboundAllowedHosts,
       allowRawAgentToken: c.allowRawAgentToken === true,
     },
@@ -1038,6 +1145,7 @@ function validateConfigPatch(partial) {
     'workspaceRoot',
     'retainSkillCredentialsOnLogout',
     'skillCredentialTtlSeconds',
+    'sessionIdleTimeoutHours',
     'outboundAllowedHosts',
     'initialAdminEmpNo',
     'allowOpenRegistration',
@@ -1067,6 +1175,13 @@ function validateConfigPatch(partial) {
       throw err('invalid_ttl')
     }
   }
+  if (partial.sessionIdleTimeoutHours !== undefined) {
+    const raw = partial.sessionIdleTimeoutHours
+    const n = raw === '' || raw == null ? NaN : Number(raw)
+    if (!isValidSessionIdleHours(n)) {
+      throw err('invalid_session_idle_timeout')
+    }
+  }
   if (partial.outboundAllowedHosts !== undefined) {
     const raw = partial.outboundAllowedHosts
     const list = Array.isArray(raw)
@@ -1093,6 +1208,7 @@ async function saveRuntimeConfig(partial) {
     'workspaceRoot',
     'retainSkillCredentialsOnLogout',
     'skillCredentialTtlSeconds',
+    'sessionIdleTimeoutHours',
     'outboundAllowedHosts',
     'initialAdminEmpNo',
     'allowOpenRegistration',
@@ -1104,7 +1220,7 @@ async function saveRuntimeConfig(partial) {
     if (partial[k] !== undefined) {
       if (k === 'retainSkillCredentialsOnLogout' || k === 'allowOpenRegistration' || k === 'allowRawAgentToken') {
         next[k] = partial[k] === true || partial[k] === 'true'
-      } else if (k === 'skillCredentialTtlSeconds') {
+      } else if (k === 'skillCredentialTtlSeconds' || k === 'sessionIdleTimeoutHours') {
         next[k] = Number(partial[k])
       } else if (k === 'outboundAllowedHosts') {
         // Preserve [] / '' as deny-all; do not String([]) → "[]".
@@ -1223,6 +1339,12 @@ async function handleAllRoutes(req, res) {
       return await handleConfigGet(req, res)
     }
 
+    // Read-only liveness probe for the client idle watcher. Deliberately bypasses the auth
+    // middleware: polling must not slide the idle TTL, or an idle tab would never expire.
+    if (pathname === '/uds-auth/session-status' && method === 'GET') {
+      return await handleSessionStatus(req, res)
+    }
+
     // 下面都是 /uds-auth/api/* — 走 handleRequest（含鉴权）
     if (pathname.startsWith('/uds-auth/api/')) {
       return await handleRequest(req, res)
@@ -1553,6 +1675,7 @@ export async function apply(ctx, config = {}) {
           userSearchUrl: next.userSearchUrl,
           outboundAllowedHosts: next.outboundAllowedHosts,
           skillCredentialTtlSeconds: next.skillCredentialTtlSeconds,
+          sessionIdleTimeoutHours: next.sessionIdleTimeoutHours,
           workspaceRoot: next.workspaceRoot || undefined,
           trustedHosts: next.trustedHosts,
         })
@@ -1571,6 +1694,7 @@ export async function apply(ctx, config = {}) {
           userSearchUrl: next.userSearchUrl,
           outboundAllowedHosts: next.outboundAllowedHosts,
           skillCredentialTtlSeconds: next.skillCredentialTtlSeconds,
+          sessionIdleTimeoutHours: next.sessionIdleTimeoutHours,
           workspaceRoot: next.workspaceRoot || undefined,
           trustedHosts: next.trustedHosts,
         })
@@ -1647,6 +1771,7 @@ async function initServices(ctx, config) {
         userSearchUrl: _currentConfig.userSearchUrl,
         outboundAllowedHosts: _currentConfig.outboundAllowedHosts,
         skillCredentialTtlSeconds: _currentConfig.skillCredentialTtlSeconds,
+        sessionIdleTimeoutHours: _currentConfig.sessionIdleTimeoutHours,
         workspaceRoot: _currentConfig.workspaceRoot || undefined,
         trustedHosts: _currentConfig.trustedHosts,
       })
@@ -1665,6 +1790,9 @@ async function initServices(ctx, config) {
     if (!_currentConfig.skillCredentialTtlSeconds) {
       _currentConfig.skillCredentialTtlSeconds = CONFIG_DEFAULTS.skillCredentialTtlSeconds
     }
+    if (_currentConfig.sessionIdleTimeoutHours == null || _currentConfig.sessionIdleTimeoutHours === '') {
+      _currentConfig.sessionIdleTimeoutHours = CONFIG_DEFAULTS.sessionIdleTimeoutHours
+    }
     // R05: only default when field absent — empty string / [] means deny-all.
     if (_currentConfig.outboundAllowedHosts === undefined || _currentConfig.outboundAllowedHosts === null) {
       _currentConfig.outboundAllowedHosts = CONFIG_DEFAULTS.outboundAllowedHosts
@@ -1714,12 +1842,6 @@ async function initServices(ctx, config) {
     const rememberSkillCreds = (empNo, token) => {
       try { _skillCredentials?.set(empNo, token) } catch { /* ignore */ }
     }
-    const revokeInvalidUdsAccount = async (empNo) => {
-      await _sessionStore.revokeEmpNo(empNo)
-      try { _sessionBridge?.revokeEmpNo?.(empNo) } catch { /* ignore */ }
-      try { _skillCredentials?.delete(empNo) } catch { /* ignore */ }
-      try { _taskCapabilities?.revokeEmpNo(empNo) } catch { /* ignore */ }
-    }
 
     _authMiddleware = createAuthMiddleware({
       get userSearchUrl() { return _currentConfig?.userSearchUrl },
@@ -1738,31 +1860,32 @@ async function initServices(ctx, config) {
       sessionBridge: _sessionBridge,
     })
 
-    // Revalidate QR-authenticated sessions against the UDS department profile.
-    // The session store still enforces the independent seven-day absolute limit.
-    const udsSessionCheckTimer = setInterval(async () => {
-      let sessions
-      try {
-        sessions = await _sessionStore.listUdsSessionsForValidation()
-      } catch (err) {
-        ctx.logger?.warn?.('[uds-auth] failed to enumerate UDS sessions for validation:', err?.message || err)
-        return
+    // The UAC token is what actually expires. Check it every 2 hours; a rejected token is
+    // only flagged (client prompts a QR refresh) — never a sign-out, so conversations and
+    // night-time cron keep running. See uds/session-revalidation.js.
+    const {
+      UdsTokenMonitor,
+      UDS_TOKEN_CHECK_INTERVAL_MS,
+      UDS_TOKEN_FIRST_CHECK_MS,
+    } = await import('./uds/session-revalidation.js')
+    _tokenMonitor = new UdsTokenMonitor({
+      sessionStore: _sessionStore,
+      verify: (empNo, token, opts) => _authMiddleware.verifyEmpNoAndToken(empNo, token, opts),
+      logger: ctx.logger,
+    })
+    const runTokenCheck = async () => {
+      try { await _tokenMonitor.runRound() } catch (err) {
+        ctx.logger?.warn?.('[uds-auth] UAC token check failed: %s', err?.message || err)
       }
-      for (const session of sessions) {
-        if (!await _sessionStore.getBySessionId(session.sessionId)) continue
-        try {
-          if (!session.token || !await _authMiddleware.verifyEmpNoAndToken(session.empNo, session.token)) {
-            await revokeInvalidUdsAccount(session.empNo)
-            ctx.logger?.info?.('[uds-auth] UDS sessions revoked after profile validation failed for %s', session.empNo)
-          }
-        } catch (err) {
-          await revokeInvalidUdsAccount(session.empNo)
-          ctx.logger?.info?.('[uds-auth] UDS sessions revoked after profile validation error for %s: %s', session.empNo, err?.message || err)
-        }
-      }
-    }, 6 * 60 * 60 * 1000)
-    udsSessionCheckTimer.unref?.()
-    ctx.effect?.(() => () => clearInterval(udsSessionCheckTimer), 'uds-auth: UDS session validation')
+    }
+    const udsTokenFirstCheck = setTimeout(runTokenCheck, UDS_TOKEN_FIRST_CHECK_MS)
+    const udsTokenCheckTimer = setInterval(runTokenCheck, UDS_TOKEN_CHECK_INTERVAL_MS)
+    udsTokenFirstCheck.unref?.()
+    udsTokenCheckTimer.unref?.()
+    ctx.effect?.(() => () => {
+      clearTimeout(udsTokenFirstCheck)
+      clearInterval(udsTokenCheckTimer)
+    }, 'uds-auth: UAC token check')
 
     _apiHandlers = createApiHandlers(
       { session: INTERNAL.session },
@@ -1876,6 +1999,7 @@ async function initServices(ctx, config) {
       getSessionStore: () => _sessionStore,
       ensureUserWorkspace,
       getWorkspaceRegistry: () => _workspaceRegistry,
+      onPrincipalActive: slideActiveSession,
     })
 
     const { resolveWorkspaceRoot } = await import('./workspace-provision.js')
diff --git a/uds-auth/lib/middleware/auth-middleware.js b/uds-auth/lib/middleware/auth-middleware.js
index 284e6553..fdd843bc 100644
--- a/uds-auth/lib/middleware/auth-middleware.js
+++ b/uds-auth/lib/middleware/auth-middleware.js
@@ -32,8 +32,10 @@ export function createAuthMiddleware(config, sessionStore, rolesStore, hooks = {
     authMode: config.udsAuth?.authMode || 'token+profile',
   }
   const udsValidator = new UdsValidator(validatorConfig)
-  const { cookieMaxAge, slidingExpiration } = config.session
-  const ttlSeconds = Math.floor(cookieMaxAge / 1000)
+  const { slidingExpiration } = config.session
+  // Read per request: cookieMaxAge follows the live sessionIdleTimeoutHours setting.
+  const ttlSeconds = () => Math.floor(config.session.cookieMaxAge / 1000)
+  const slidingIntervalMs = Math.max(0, Number(config.session.slidingInterval) || 0)
   const userSearchUrl = config.userSearchUrl || config.udsAuth?.userSearchUrl
   const uacBaseUrl = config.udsAuth?.baseUrl || ''
   /** R05: read live — do not freeze allowOpenRegistration at middleware create time. */
@@ -196,7 +198,7 @@ export function createAuthMiddleware(config, sessionStore, rolesStore, hooks = {
     }
     const userContext = { ...session.userData, empNo, _sessionId: session.sessionId }
     if (persistTouch || slidingExpiration) {
-      await sessionStore.touch(session.sessionId, ttlSeconds)
+      await sessionStore.touch(session.sessionId, ttlSeconds())
       userContext.lastActiveAt = new Date().toISOString()
     }
     const role = kind === 'fallback' || kind === 'sealed_box' || rolesStore.hasRole(empNo)
@@ -213,17 +215,19 @@ export function createAuthMiddleware(config, sessionStore, rolesStore, hooks = {
     ctx.authVia = 'session'
     ctx.authKind = kind
     if (res && req && session._bearerForCookie) {
-      const cookie = buildSessionCookie(session._bearerForCookie, ttlSeconds, {
-        secure: isHttpsRequest(req),
-      })
-      const prev = res.getHeader?.('Set-Cookie')
-      const list = Array.isArray(prev) ? [...prev, cookie] : (prev ? [prev, cookie] : [cookie])
-      res.setHeader?.('Set-Cookie', list)
+      appendSessionCookie(req, res, session._bearerForCookie)
     }
   }
 
+  function appendSessionCookie(req, res, bearer) {
+    const cookie = buildSessionCookie(bearer, ttlSeconds(), { secure: isHttpsRequest(req) })
+    const prev = res.getHeader?.('Set-Cookie')
+    const list = Array.isArray(prev) ? [...prev, cookie] : (prev ? [prev, cookie] : [cookie])
+    res.setHeader?.('Set-Cookie', list)
+  }
+
   async function mintSession(ctx, userContext, kind, { res, req } = {}) {
-    const { sessionId, bearer, record } = await sessionStore.create(userContext, ttlSeconds)
+    const { sessionId, bearer, record } = await sessionStore.create(userContext, ttlSeconds())
     if (userContext.token) {
       try { onSkillCredentials?.(userContext.empNo, userContext.token) } catch { /* ignore */ }
     }
@@ -262,7 +266,15 @@ export function createAuthMiddleware(config, sessionStore, rolesStore, hooks = {
           throw err
         }
         // Keep the Desktop bridge alive as long as its session (same bearer).
-        try { sessionBridge?.touch?.(extracted.bearer, ttlSeconds * 1000) } catch { /* ignore */ }
+        try { sessionBridge?.touch?.(extracted.bearer, ttlSeconds() * 1000) } catch { /* ignore */ }
+        // Slide the browser cookie with the server idle TTL. Without this UDS_SESSION kept
+        // the Max-Age from login and vanished 30 min later even for active users.
+        // Throttled by slidingInterval so not every request carries Set-Cookie.
+        if (slidingExpiration && extracted.via === 'cookie' && res && req
+          && !res.headersSent
+          && Date.now() + ttlSeconds() * 1000 - Number(session.expiresAt || 0) >= slidingIntervalMs) {
+          try { appendSessionCookie(req, res, extracted.bearer) } catch { /* ignore */ }
+        }
         return next()
       }
       // Explicit bearer presented but invalid — do not mix with portal cookies.
diff --git a/uds-auth/lib/session-bridge.js b/uds-auth/lib/session-bridge.js
index e0443ce2..e725dcd2 100644
--- a/uds-auth/lib/session-bridge.js
+++ b/uds-auth/lib/session-bridge.js
@@ -157,6 +157,21 @@ export class SessionBridgeStore {
     return true
   }
 
+  /**
+   * Slide every live bridge of an empNo. Used when activity arrives over the WS mux,
+   * where only the sessionId (not the bearer) is known. Safe: a bridge only carries
+   * the bearer — the session store still decides whether it authenticates.
+   * @param {string} empNo
+   * @param {number} [ttlMs]
+   */
+  touchEmpNo(empNo, ttlMs) {
+    const e = String(empNo || '').trim()
+    if (!e) return
+    for (const [token, row] of this._byToken) {
+      if (row.empNo === e) this.touch(token, ttlMs)
+    }
+  }
+
   /** Clear all bridge tokens for an empNo (logout). */
   revokeEmpNo(empNo) {
     const e = String(empNo || '').trim()
diff --git a/uds-auth/lib/session/memory-store.js b/uds-auth/lib/session/memory-store.js
index 54c69d7c..28e25e89 100644
--- a/uds-auth/lib/session/memory-store.js
+++ b/uds-auth/lib/session/memory-store.js
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import { createHash, randomBytes, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto'
 import { readFile } from 'node:fs/promises'
-import { SessionStore, SESSION_ABSOLUTE_MAX_SECONDS } from './store.js'
+import { SessionStore, absoluteCapSeconds } from './store.js'
 import { atomicWriteJson } from '../utils/atomic-write.js'
 import { loadOrCreateSecretKey, sealSecret, openSecret } from '../utils/secret-box.js'
 
@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ function safeEqualHex(a, b) {
  * Persistence (opts.file + opts.dataDir): bearer hashes and expiry in clear,
  * userData (may carry the UAC token) sealed with the plugin AES-GCM key.
  */
+/** Longest delay setTimeout honors (2^31 - 1 ms). */
+const MAX_TIMER_MS = 2_147_483_647
+
 export class MemoryStore extends SessionStore {
   /**
    * @param {{ file?: string, dataDir?: string, logger?: any }} [opts]
@@ -178,10 +181,16 @@ export class MemoryStore extends SessionStore {
       this._timers.delete(sessionId)
     }
     if (!ttlSeconds || ttlSeconds <= 0) return
+    // setTimeout fires immediately past ~24.8 days; long TTLs re-arm in chunks.
+    const delay = Math.min(ttlSeconds * 1000, MAX_TIMER_MS)
     const timer = setTimeout(() => {
+      this._timers.delete(sessionId)
       const row = this._sessions.get(sessionId)
-      if (row) this._removeRecord(sessionId, row)
-    }, ttlSeconds * 1000)
+      if (!row) return
+      const left = row.expiresAt - Date.now()
+      if (left > 0) this._scheduleExpiry(sessionId, Math.ceil(left / 1000))
+      else this._removeRecord(sessionId, row)
+    }, delay)
     // Do not keep the process alive solely for session TTLs (tests / short-lived hosts).
     if (typeof timer.unref === 'function') timer.unref()
     this._timers.set(sessionId, timer)
@@ -210,7 +219,7 @@ export class MemoryStore extends SessionStore {
     const ttl = Math.max(60, Number(ttlSeconds) || 1800)
     // Idle TTL slides via touch(); absolute lifetime is a fixed 7 days. (Was min(ttl, 7d),
     // which capped every session at its 30-min idle TTL and made sliding a no-op.)
-    const absoluteCap = SESSION_ABSOLUTE_MAX_SECONDS
+    const absoluteCap = absoluteCapSeconds(ttl)
     const record = {
       sessionId,
       bearerHash,
@@ -305,6 +314,10 @@ export class MemoryStore extends SessionStore {
     const row = this._purgeExpired(String(sessionId || ''))
     if (!row) return null
     const ttl = Math.max(60, Number(ttlSeconds) || 1800)
+    // "No auto sign-out" TTLs also lift the cap of sessions minted under the 7-day default.
+    if (absoluteCapSeconds(ttl) > absoluteCapSeconds(0)) {
+      row.absoluteExpiresAt = Math.max(row.absoluteExpiresAt || 0, Date.now() + ttl * 1000)
+    }
     const absLeft = row.absoluteExpiresAt
       ? Math.max(0, Math.floor((row.absoluteExpiresAt - Date.now()) / 1000))
       : ttl
@@ -323,6 +336,14 @@ export class MemoryStore extends SessionStore {
     return this._publicRecord(row)
   }
 
+  async updateUserData(sessionId, patch) {
+    const row = this._purgeExpired(String(sessionId || ''))
+    if (!row) return null
+    row.userData = { ...row.userData, ...patch }
+    this._scheduleSave()
+    return this._publicRecord(row)
+  }
+
   async revokeSession(sessionId) {
     const row = this._sessions.get(String(sessionId || ''))
     if (!row) return false
diff --git a/uds-auth/lib/session/redis-store.js b/uds-auth/lib/session/redis-store.js
index 79f15f3b..ac559d16 100644
--- a/uds-auth/lib/session/redis-store.js
+++ b/uds-auth/lib/session/redis-store.js
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import { createHash, randomBytes } from 'node:crypto'
-import { SessionStore, SESSION_ABSOLUTE_MAX_SECONDS } from './store.js'
+import { SessionStore, absoluteCapSeconds } from './store.js'
 
 function hashBearer(bearer) {
   return createHash('sha256').update(String(bearer)).digest('hex')
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ export class RedisStore extends SessionStore {
       userData: { ...userData },
       createdAt: now,
       expiresAt: now + ttl * 1000,
-      absoluteExpiresAt: now + SESSION_ABSOLUTE_MAX_SECONDS * 1000,
+      absoluteExpiresAt: now + absoluteCapSeconds(ttl) * 1000,
     }
     const payload = JSON.stringify(record)
     await this._client.setEx(this._sessKey(sessionId), ttl, payload)
@@ -120,6 +120,9 @@ export class RedisStore extends SessionStore {
     const row = await this._load(sessionId)
     if (!row) return null
     const ttl = Math.max(60, Number(ttlSeconds) || 1800)
+    if (absoluteCapSeconds(ttl) > absoluteCapSeconds(0)) {
+      row.absoluteExpiresAt = Math.max(row.absoluteExpiresAt || 0, Date.now() + ttl * 1000)
+    }
     const absLeft = row.absoluteExpiresAt
       ? Math.max(0, Math.floor((row.absoluteExpiresAt - Date.now()) / 1000))
       : ttl
@@ -135,6 +138,16 @@ export class RedisStore extends SessionStore {
     return this._public(row)
   }
 
+  async updateUserData(sessionId, patch) {
+    const row = await this._load(sessionId)
+    if (!row) return null
+    const left = Math.floor((Number(row.expiresAt) - Date.now()) / 1000)
+    if (left <= 0) return null
+    row.userData = { ...row.userData, ...patch }
+    await this._client.setEx(this._sessKey(sessionId), left, JSON.stringify(row))
+    return this._public(row)
+  }
+
   async revokeSession(sessionId) {
     const row = await this._load(sessionId)
     if (!row) {
diff --git a/uds-auth/lib/session/store.js b/uds-auth/lib/session/store.js
index 6fb655ff..0bc23f00 100644
--- a/uds-auth/lib/session/store.js
+++ b/uds-auth/lib/session/store.js
@@ -36,6 +36,11 @@ export class SessionStore {
     throw new Error('SessionStore#touch must be implemented')
   }
 
+  /** Merge fields into a live session's userData (e.g. a refreshed UAC token). */
+  async updateUserData(sessionId, patch) {
+    throw new Error('SessionStore#updateUserData must be implemented')
+  }
+
   async revokeSession(sessionId) {
     throw new Error('SessionStore#revokeSession must be implemented')
   }
@@ -92,3 +97,11 @@ export const SESSION_COOKIE = 'UDS_SESSION'
 export const SESSION_HEADER = 'x-uds-session'
 /** Absolute session lifetime; idle expiry (cookieMaxAge) slides within it. */
 export const SESSION_ABSOLUTE_MAX_SECONDS = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60
+
+/**
+ * Absolute lifetime for a session with this idle TTL. A TTL above 7 days means
+ * "no automatic sign-out" (sessionIdleTimeoutHours = 0), so the cap follows the TTL.
+ */
+export function absoluteCapSeconds(ttlSeconds) {
+  return Math.max(SESSION_ABSOLUTE_MAX_SECONDS, Number(ttlSeconds) || 0)
+}
diff --git a/uds-auth/lib/uds/session-revalidation.js b/uds-auth/lib/uds/session-revalidation.js
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..8a90627a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/uds-auth/lib/uds/session-revalidation.js
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+/**
+ * Periodic UAC token check for QR-authenticated sessions.
+ *
+ * The UAC token is what actually expires: it must still read the user's department
+ * profile from icenterapi for UAC-backed work (skills, cron) to succeed. A rejected
+ * token never signs anyone out — conversations and night-time cron keep their local
+ * session. The session is only flagged; the client then shows a QR prompt and a scan
+ * refreshes the token in place (see handleQrProxy → refreshSessionToken).
+ *
+ * Network errors, 5xx and malformed responses say nothing about the token and leave
+ * the previous verdict unchanged.
+ */
+
+/** 2 hours between rounds. */
+export const UDS_TOKEN_CHECK_INTERVAL_MS = 2 * 60 * 60 * 1000
+/** First round shortly after start so flags lost on restart come back quickly. */
+export const UDS_TOKEN_FIRST_CHECK_MS = 60 * 1000
+
+/** searchUserByEmpNoToken / verifyEmpNoAndToken failure reasons that reject the token. */
+export const DEFINITIVE_PROFILE_FAILURES = new Set([
+  'http_auth',        // 401 / 403
+  'biz_code',         // icenterapi business error
+  'empty',            // token cannot see this employee
+  'emp_mismatch',
+  'ambiguous',
+  'reserved_subject',
+  'missing_args',     // session carries no token
+])
+
+export class UdsTokenMonitor {
+  /**
+   * @param {{
+   *   sessionStore: { listUdsSessionsForValidation(): Promise<any[]> },
+   *   verify: (empNo: string, token: string, opts: { onFailure?: (out: any) => void }) => Promise<object|null>,
+   *   logger?: { info?: Function, warn?: Function },
+   * }} deps
+   */
+  constructor(deps) {
+    this.deps = deps
+    /** sessionId → { empNo, reason, since } for sessions whose UAC token was rejected. */
+    this.rejected = new Map()
+  }
+
+  async _classify(empNo, token) {
+    if (!token) return { verdict: 'invalid', reason: 'missing_args' }
+    let failure = null
+    try {
+      const profile = await this.deps.verify(empNo, token, { onFailure: (out) => { failure = out } })
+      if (profile) return { verdict: 'ok' }
+    } catch (err) {
+      return { verdict: 'unknown', reason: err?.message || 'error' }
+    }
+    const reason = String(failure?.reason || 'unknown')
+    return { verdict: DEFINITIVE_PROFILE_FAILURES.has(reason) ? 'invalid' : 'unknown', reason }
+  }
+
+  /** True when this session's UAC token was rejected and has not been refreshed since. */
+  isTokenRejected(sessionId) {
+    return this.rejected.has(String(sessionId || ''))
+  }
+
+  /** A fresh, verified token was written into these sessions. */
+  markRefreshed(sessionIds) {
+    for (const id of sessionIds) this.rejected.delete(String(id))
+  }
+
+  /** Verify every live QR session's token (one icenterapi call per empNo+token). */
+  async runRound() {
+    const { sessionStore, logger } = this.deps
+    const sessions = await sessionStore.listUdsSessionsForValidation()
+    const verdicts = new Map()
+    const stats = { checked: 0, ok: 0, rejected: 0, inconclusive: 0 }
+    for (const session of sessions) {
+      stats.checked++
+      const key = `${session.empNo}\0${session.token || ''}`
+      let result = verdicts.get(key)
+      if (!result) {
+        result = await this._classify(session.empNo, session.token)
+        verdicts.set(key, result)
+        if (result.verdict === 'unknown') {
+          logger?.warn?.('[uds-auth] UAC token check inconclusive for %s (%s); keeping previous status', session.empNo, result.reason)
+        } else if (result.verdict === 'invalid') {
+          logger?.info?.('[uds-auth] UAC token rejected for %s (%s); prompting a QR refresh', session.empNo, result.reason)
+        }
+      }
+      if (result.verdict === 'ok') {
+        this.rejected.delete(session.sessionId)
+        stats.ok++
+      } else if (result.verdict === 'invalid') {
+        if (!this.rejected.has(session.sessionId)) {
+          this.rejected.set(session.sessionId, { empNo: session.empNo, reason: result.reason, since: Date.now() })
+        }
+        stats.rejected++
+      } else {
+        stats.inconclusive++
+      }
+    }
+    const live = new Set(sessions.map((s) => s.sessionId))
+    for (const id of this.rejected.keys()) if (!live.has(id)) this.rejected.delete(id)
+    return stats
+  }
+}
diff --git a/uds-auth/package.json b/uds-auth/package.json
index fab94054..1dc1f6e7 100644
--- a/uds-auth/package.json
+++ b/uds-auth/package.json
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "uds-auth",
-  "version": "0.3.19",
+  "version": "0.3.20",
   "description": "UDS authentication plugin for DeepSeek Harness — trusted single-instance access control (not strong multi-tenant isolation)",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "lib/index.js",
diff --git a/uds-auth/test/auth-session-p0.test.js b/uds-auth/test/auth-session-p0.test.js
index 106ff79c..e6ccd374 100644
--- a/uds-auth/test/auth-session-p0.test.js
+++ b/uds-auth/test/auth-session-p0.test.js
@@ -274,3 +274,62 @@ test('bearer hash is not reversible from store maps', async () => {
   assert.ok(store._byBearer.has(hash))
   assert.equal([...store._byBearer.keys()].includes(bearer), false)
 })
+
+test('active cookie session re-issues UDS_SESSION so the browser cookie slides too', async () => {
+  const store = new MemoryStore()
+  const roles = mockRoles({ '12345': ROLES.USER })
+  const mw = createAuthMiddleware({
+    userSearchUrl: 'http://127.0.0.1:9/never',
+    udsAuth: { baseUrl: 'http://127.0.0.1:9' },
+    session: { cookieMaxAge: 1800000, slidingExpiration: true, slidingInterval: 300000 },
+  }, store, roles, {})
+  const { sessionId, bearer } = await store.create({ empNo: '12345', isAuthenticated: true }, 1800)
+  const call = async () => {
+    const headers = {}
+    const res = { getHeader: (k) => headers[k], setHeader: (k, v) => { headers[k] = v } }
+    const ctx = { req: { headers: { cookie: `${SESSION_COOKIE}=${bearer}` }, socket: {} }, res }
+    await mw(ctx, async () => {})
+    assert.equal(ctx.empNo, '12345')
+    return [].concat(headers['Set-Cookie'] || []).find((c) => c.startsWith(`${SESSION_COOKIE}=`))
+  }
+
+  // Fresh session (within slidingInterval of login): no Set-Cookie churn.
+  assert.equal(await call(), undefined)
+
+  // 20 min later the idle window has drifted past slidingInterval → cookie re-issued.
+  store._sessions.get(sessionId).expiresAt = Date.now() + 10 * 60 * 1000
+  const cookie = await call()
+  assert.ok(cookie, 'UDS_SESSION re-issued')
+  assert.match(cookie, /Max-Age=1800/)
+  assert.match(cookie, /HttpOnly/)
+})
+
+test('idle TTL follows the live session config (sessionIdleTimeoutHours) without restart', async () => {
+  const store = new MemoryStore()
+  const roles = mockRoles({ '12345': ROLES.USER })
+  let hours = 24
+  const session = {
+    get cookieMaxAge() { return hours * 60 * 60 * 1000 },
+    slidingExpiration: true,
+    slidingInterval: 300000,
+  }
+  const mw = createAuthMiddleware({
+    userSearchUrl: 'http://127.0.0.1:9/never',
+    udsAuth: { baseUrl: 'http://127.0.0.1:9' },
+    session,
+  }, store, roles, {})
+  const { sessionId, bearer } = await store.create({ empNo: '12345', isAuthenticated: true }, 60)
+  const call = async () => {
+    const headers = {}
+    const res = { getHeader: (k) => headers[k], setHeader: (k, v) => { headers[k] = v } }
+    await mw({ req: { headers: { cookie: `${SESSION_COOKIE}=${bearer}` }, socket: {} }, res }, async () => {})
+    return [].concat(headers['Set-Cookie'] || []).find((c) => c.startsWith(`${SESSION_COOKIE}=`))
+  }
+  assert.match(await call(), /Max-Age=86400/)
+  assert.ok(store._sessions.get(sessionId).expiresAt > Date.now() + 23 * 60 * 60_000)
+
+  hours = 2
+  store._sessions.get(sessionId).expiresAt = Date.now() + 60_000
+  assert.match(await call(), /Max-Age=7200/)
+  assert.ok(store._sessions.get(sessionId).expiresAt <= Date.now() + 2 * 60 * 60_000)
+})
diff --git a/uds-auth/test/emergency-workspace-follow.test.js b/uds-auth/test/emergency-workspace-follow.test.js
index c54f2842..2dc7661a 100644
--- a/uds-auth/test/emergency-workspace-follow.test.js
+++ b/uds-auth/test/emergency-workspace-follow.test.js
@@ -351,3 +351,42 @@ test('anonymous stream endpoints are parked until the carrier aborts (no termina
   for await (const f of authed.method()) frames.push(f)
   assert.deepEqual(frames, [{ status: 'credential-stored' }])
 })
+
+test('WS activity (assertPrincipalLive) reports the live session so its idle TTL slides', async () => {
+  const stores = makeStores()
+  const [, kind, ctxOf] = EMERGENCY_LOGINS[0]
+  const { bearer } = await login(stores, ctxOf(), kind)
+  const session = await stores.sessionStore.getByBearer(bearer)
+  const seen = []
+  const noop = async () => {}
+  const wc = {
+    create: noop, rename: noop, delete: noop, insertBefore: noop, insertSessionBefore: noop,
+    archiveSession: noop, unarchiveSession: noop, pinSession: noop, unpinSession: noop,
+    async *follow() { yield { type: 'baseline', value: { items: [], archivedSessionIds: [], pinnedSessionIds: [] } } },
+  }
+  installDshAcl({
+    inject(deps, cb) { if (deps.includes('workspaceController')) cb({ workspaceController: wc }) },
+    on() { return () => {} },
+    get() { throw new Error('no service') },
+  }, {
+    sessionAcl: { getOwner: () => null, setOwner() {} },
+    userWorkspaces: new UserWorkspaceStore({}),
+    getWorkspaceRoot: () => '',
+    getRolesStore: () => stores.roles,
+    getSessionStore: () => stores.sessionStore,
+    ensureUserWorkspace: async () => ({ workspaceId: 'ws-admin' }),
+    getWorkspaceRegistry: () => ({ list: () => [], get: () => null }),
+    onPrincipalActive: (sid, emp) => seen.push([sid, emp]),
+  })
+  await collect(wc, identityFromSessionRecord(session, stores.roles))
+  assert.deepEqual(seen[0], [session.sessionId, 'administrator'])
+})
+
+test('SessionBridgeStore.touchEmpNo slides every live bridge of that account only', () => {
+  const store = new SessionBridgeStore({ ttlMs: 60_000 })
+  const a = store.mint({ empNo: 'alice', kind: 'uds' })
+  const b = store.mint({ empNo: 'bob', kind: 'uds' })
+  store.touchEmpNo('alice', 10 * 60_000)
+  assert.ok(store._byToken.get(a.token).exp > Date.now() + 5 * 60_000)
+  assert.ok(store._byToken.get(b.token).exp <= Date.now() + 60_000)
+})
diff --git a/uds-auth/test/session-revalidation.test.js b/uds-auth/test/session-revalidation.test.js
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..380c4244
--- /dev/null
+++ b/uds-auth/test/session-revalidation.test.js
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+import { test } from 'node:test'
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict'
+import { MemoryStore } from '../lib/session/memory-store.js'
+import { SESSION_ABSOLUTE_MAX_SECONDS } from '../lib/session/store.js'
+import {
+  UdsTokenMonitor,
+  UDS_TOKEN_CHECK_INTERVAL_MS,
+} from '../lib/uds/session-revalidation.js'
+
+async function login(store, empNo, token, ttl = 24 * 3600) {
+  const { sessionId } = await store.create({ empNo, token, authMode: 'uds-qr', isAuthenticated: true }, ttl)
+  return sessionId
+}
+
+/** verify() stub: token → 'ok' | failure object | Error. Mutable via `outcomes`. */
+function verifier(outcomes) {
+  const calls = []
+  const verify = async (empNo, token, opts) => {
+    calls.push(token)
+    const out = outcomes[token]
+    if (out instanceof Error) throw out
+    if (out === 'ok') return { empNo }
+    opts?.onFailure?.(out)
+    return null
+  }
+  return { verify, calls }
+}
+
+test('UAC token is checked every 2 hours', () => {
+  assert.equal(UDS_TOKEN_CHECK_INTERVAL_MS, 2 * 60 * 60 * 1000)
+})
+
+test('a rejected UAC token is only flagged — the session is never signed out', async () => {
+  const store = new MemoryStore()
+  const auth = await login(store, 'u-auth', 'tok-auth')
+  const biz = await login(store, 'u-biz', 'tok-biz')
+  const good = await login(store, 'u-ok', 'tok-ok')
+  const { verify } = verifier({
+    'tok-auth': { ok: false, reason: 'http_auth', statusCode: 401 },
+    'tok-biz': { ok: false, reason: 'biz_code', code: '1001' },
+    'tok-ok': 'ok',
+  })
+  const m = new UdsTokenMonitor({ sessionStore: store, verify })
+  assert.deepEqual(await m.runRound(), { checked: 3, ok: 1, rejected: 2, inconclusive: 0 })
+  for (const id of [auth, biz, good]) assert.ok(await store.getBySessionId(id), 'session kept')
+  assert.equal(m.isTokenRejected(auth), true)
+  assert.equal(m.isTokenRejected(biz), true)
+  assert.equal(m.isTokenRejected(good), false)
+})
+
+test('icenterapi outages neither flag nor clear a token', async () => {
+  const store = new MemoryStore()
+  const id = await login(store, 'u1', 'tok')
+  const outcomes = { tok: { ok: false, reason: 'http_auth' } }
+  const { verify } = verifier(outcomes)
+  const m = new UdsTokenMonitor({ sessionStore: store, verify })
+  await m.runRound()
+  assert.equal(m.isTokenRejected(id), true)
+  for (const out of [{ ok: false, reason: 'network' }, { ok: false, reason: 'http_status' }, { ok: false, reason: 'bad_json' }, new Error('reset')]) {
+    outcomes.tok = out
+    assert.equal((await m.runRound()).inconclusive, 1)
+    assert.equal(m.isTokenRejected(id), true, 'previous verdict kept')
+  }
+  const fresh = await login(store, 'u2', 'tok2')
+  outcomes.tok2 = { ok: false, reason: 'network' }
+  await m.runRound()
+  assert.equal(m.isTokenRejected(fresh), false, 'outage does not flag a healthy session')
+})
+
+test('a token that verifies again (or is refreshed) clears the flag', async () => {
+  const store = new MemoryStore()
+  const id = await login(store, 'u1', 'tok')
+  const outcomes = { tok: { ok: false, reason: 'biz_code' } }
+  const { verify } = verifier(outcomes)
+  const m = new UdsTokenMonitor({ sessionStore: store, verify })
+  await m.runRound()
+  outcomes.tok = 'ok'
+  await m.runRound()
+  assert.equal(m.isTokenRejected(id), false)
+
+  outcomes.tok = { ok: false, reason: 'http_auth' }
+  await m.runRound()
+  m.markRefreshed([id])
+  assert.equal(m.isTokenRejected(id), false)
+})
+
+test('each empNo+token is verified once per round', async () => {
+  const store = new MemoryStore()
+  await login(store, 'u2', 'tok-x')
+  await login(store, 'u2', 'tok-x')
+  const { verify, calls } = verifier({ 'tok-x': 'ok' })
+  await new UdsTokenMonitor({ sessionStore: store, verify }).runRound()
+  assert.deepEqual(calls, ['tok-x'])
+})
+
+test('updateUserData writes a refreshed token in place', async () => {
+  const store = new MemoryStore()
+  const id = await login(store, 'u1', 'old')
+  await store.updateUserData(id, { token: 'new', tokenRefreshedAt: 'now' })
+  const [row] = await store.listUdsSessionsForValidation()
+  assert.equal(row.sessionId, id)
+  assert.equal(row.token, 'new')
+})
+
+test('"never sign out" TTL: no absolute cap, long timers do not fire early', async () => {
+  const TEN_YEARS = 10 * 365 * 24 * 3600
+  const store = new MemoryStore()
+  const id = await login(store, 'u1', 'tok', TEN_YEARS)
+  const row = store._sessions.get(id)
+  assert.ok(row.absoluteExpiresAt > Date.now() + 9 * 365 * 24 * 3600 * 1000, 'cap follows the TTL, not 7 days')
+  await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 20))
+  assert.ok(await store.getBySessionId(id), 'setTimeout overflow would have removed it already')
+
+  // Sessions minted under the 7-day default get their cap lifted on activity.
+  const old = await login(store, 'u2', 'tok2', 1800)
+  assert.ok(store._sessions.get(old).absoluteExpiresAt <= Date.now() + SESSION_ABSOLUTE_MAX_SECONDS * 1000)
+  await store.touch(old, TEN_YEARS)
+  assert.ok(store._sessions.get(old).absoluteExpiresAt > Date.now() + 9 * 365 * 24 * 3600 * 1000)
+})
diff --git a/uds-auth/test/startup-and-session-lifetime.test.js b/uds-auth/test/startup-and-session-lifetime.test.js
index e8ad82e1..728fd18f 100644
--- a/uds-auth/test/startup-and-session-lifetime.test.js
+++ b/uds-auth/test/startup-and-session-lifetime.test.js
@@ -67,3 +67,65 @@ test('other origin/host rejections still fail immediately', async () => {
   assert.equal(handled, 0)
   assert.ok(Date.now() - started < 1000)
 })
+
+test('session-status probe is routed outside the auth middleware and never slides the TTL', async () => {
+  const { readFileSync } = await import('node:fs')
+  const src = readFileSync(new URL('../lib/index.js', import.meta.url), 'utf8')
+  const probe = src.indexOf("pathname === '/uds-auth/session-status'")
+  const authed = src.indexOf("if (pathname.startsWith('/uds-auth/api/')) {")
+  assert.ok(probe > 0 && probe < authed, 'probe answers before /uds-auth/api/* auth dispatch')
+  const body = src.slice(src.indexOf('async function handleSessionStatus'), src.indexOf('// 客户端 config.get'))
+  assert.doesNotMatch(body, /touch\(|_authMiddleware/)
+
+  // getByBearer (what the probe uses) must not slide the idle TTL.
+  const store = new MemoryStore()
+  const { sessionId, bearer } = await store.create({ empNo: 'u1' }, 1800)
+  const before = store._sessions.get(sessionId).expiresAt
+  await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 5))
+  assert.ok(await store.getByBearer(bearer))
+  assert.equal(store._sessions.get(sessionId).expiresAt, before)
+})
+
+test('client signs out on confirmed idle expiry instead of prompting on every call', async () => {
+  const { readFileSync } = await import('node:fs')
+  const src = readFileSync(new URL('../lib/client.js', import.meta.url), 'utf8')
+  // Expiry is only acted on after the non-sliding probe says alive=false.
+  assert.match(src, /fetch\('\/uds-auth\/session-status'/)
+  assert.match(src, /data\.alive === false && isLoggedInInUi\(\)\) \{\s*window\.dispatchEvent\(new Event\('uds-auth-expired'\)\)/)
+  // RPC failures and HTTP 401s trigger the probe; an idle timer and focus do too.
+  assert.match(src, /looksLikeSessionGone\(result\.error\)\) \{\s*void checkSessionAlive\(\)/)
+  assert.match(src, /if \(res\.status === 401\) void checkSessionAlive\(\)/)
+  assert.match(src, /setInterval\(check, 60_000\)/)
+  // Expired sign-out skips /api/logout and tells the user why.
+  assert.match(src, /signOut\(\{ expired: true \}\)/)
+  assert.match(src, /sessionExpired \? t\('ui\.sessionExpiredSignedOut'\)/)
+})
+
+test('QR refresh renews the UAC token in place instead of minting a new session', async () => {
+  const { readFileSync } = await import('node:fs')
+  const src = readFileSync(new URL('../lib/index.js', import.meta.url), 'utf8')
+  // refresh flag is read locally and never forwarded upstream (body is rebuilt from contract fields).
+  assert.match(src, /const refreshToken = parsedBody\.refresh === true/)
+  const branch = src.slice(src.indexOf('if (refreshToken) {'), src.indexOf("const role = await _authMiddleware.resolveRoleOnLogin(id)\n          const now"))
+  assert.match(branch, /peekCallerSession\(req\)/)
+  assert.match(branch, /token_refresh_emp_mismatch/)
+  assert.match(branch, /refreshSessionToken\(id, credentials\.token, profile\)/)
+  assert.doesNotMatch(branch, /mintLoginSession|appendSessionCookie/)
+  // Default: no automatic sign-out; token rejections are flagged, not revoked.
+  assert.match(src, /sessionIdleTimeoutHours: 0,/)
+  assert.match(src, /tokenValid: session \? !_tokenMonitor\?\.isTokenRejected\(session\.sessionId\) : null/)
+  assert.doesNotMatch(src, /revokeInvalidUdsAccount|UdsSessionRevalidator/)
+})
+
+test('client prompts a refresh QR on token expiry without signing out', async () => {
+  const { readFileSync } = await import('node:fs')
+  const src = readFileSync(new URL('../lib/client.js', import.meta.url), 'utf8')
+  assert.match(src, /new Event\(data\.tokenValid \? 'uds-auth-token-ok' : 'uds-auth-token-expired'\)/)
+  // expiry opens the panel once; the token handler never calls signOut
+  const handler = src.slice(src.indexOf('const onTokenExpired = () => {'), src.indexOf('const onTokenOk = () => {'))
+  assert.match(handler, /setOpen\(true\)/)
+  assert.doesNotMatch(handler, /signOut/)
+  assert.match(src, /refreshing \? \{ qrCodeKey, qrCodeValue, refresh: true \}/)
+  assert.match(src, /if \(auth\?\.success && auth\.refreshed\) \{/)
+  assert.match(src, /const wantQr = open && loginMode === 'qr' && \(!user \|\| tokenExpired\)/)
+})