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2026-10-11 17:43:56 +08:00 · 2026-04-26 08:34:33 +08:00 · 2026-04-26 08:34:33 +08:00 · dbbe3add6a
commit dbbe3add6a
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@ -0,0 +1,541 @@
+---
+summary: "Secrets management: SecretRef contract, runtime snapshot behavior, and safe one-way scrubbing"
+read_when:
+  - Configuring SecretRefs for provider credentials and `auth-profiles.json` refs
+  - Operating secrets reload, audit, configure, and apply safely in production
+  - Understanding startup fail-fast, inactive-surface filtering, and last-known-good behavior
+title: "Secrets Management"
+---
+
+# Secrets management
+
+OpenClaw supports additive SecretRefs so supported credentials do not need to be stored as plaintext in configuration.
+
+Plaintext still works. SecretRefs are opt-in per credential.
+
+## Goals and runtime model
+
+Secrets are resolved into an in-memory runtime snapshot.
+
+- Resolution is eager during activation, not lazy on request paths.
+- Startup fails fast when an effectively active SecretRef cannot be resolved.
+- Reload uses atomic swap: full success, or keep the last-known-good snapshot.
+- SecretRef policy violations (for example OAuth-mode auth profiles combined with SecretRef input) fail activation before runtime swap.
+- Runtime requests read from the active in-memory snapshot only.
+- After the first successful config activation/load, runtime code paths keep reading that active in-memory snapshot until a successful reload swaps it.
+- Outbound delivery paths also read from that active snapshot (for example Discord reply/thread delivery and Telegram action sends); they do not re-resolve SecretRefs on each send.
+
+This keeps secret-provider outages off hot request paths.
+
+## Active-surface filtering
+
+SecretRefs are validated only on effectively active surfaces.
+
+- Enabled surfaces: unresolved refs block startup/reload.
+- Inactive surfaces: unresolved refs do not block startup/reload.
+- Inactive refs emit non-fatal diagnostics with code `SECRETS_REF_IGNORED_INACTIVE_SURFACE`.
+
+Examples of inactive surfaces:
+
+- Disabled channel/account entries.
+- Top-level channel credentials that no enabled account inherits.
+- Disabled tool/feature surfaces.
+- Web search provider-specific keys that are not selected by `tools.web.search.provider`.
+  In auto mode (provider unset), keys are consulted by precedence for provider auto-detection until one resolves.
+  After selection, non-selected provider keys are treated as inactive until selected.
+- Sandbox SSH auth material (`agents.defaults.sandbox.ssh.identityData`,
+  `certificateData`, `knownHostsData`, plus per-agent overrides) is active only
+  when the effective sandbox backend is `ssh` for the default agent or an enabled agent.
+- `gateway.remote.token` / `gateway.remote.password` SecretRefs are active if one of these is true:
+  - `gateway.mode=remote`
+  - `gateway.remote.url` is configured
+  - `gateway.tailscale.mode` is `serve` or `funnel`
+  - In local mode without those remote surfaces:
+    - `gateway.remote.token` is active when token auth can win and no env/auth token is configured.
+    - `gateway.remote.password` is active only when password auth can win and no env/auth password is configured.
+- `gateway.auth.token` SecretRef is inactive for startup auth resolution when `OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_TOKEN` is set, because env token input wins for that runtime.
+
+## Gateway auth surface diagnostics
+
+When a SecretRef is configured on `gateway.auth.token`, `gateway.auth.password`,
+`gateway.remote.token`, or `gateway.remote.password`, gateway startup/reload logs the
+surface state explicitly:
+
+- `active`: the SecretRef is part of the effective auth surface and must resolve.
+- `inactive`: the SecretRef is ignored for this runtime because another auth surface wins, or
+  because remote auth is disabled/not active.
+
+These entries are logged with `SECRETS_GATEWAY_AUTH_SURFACE` and include the reason used by the
+active-surface policy, so you can see why a credential was treated as active or inactive.
+
+## Onboarding reference preflight
+
+When onboarding runs in interactive mode and you choose SecretRef storage, OpenClaw runs preflight validation before saving:
+
+- Env refs: validates env var name and confirms a non-empty value is visible during setup.
+- Provider refs (`file` or `exec`): validates provider selection, resolves `id`, and checks resolved value type.
+- Quickstart reuse path: when `gateway.auth.token` is already a SecretRef, onboarding resolves it before probe/dashboard bootstrap (for `env`, `file`, and `exec` refs) using the same fail-fast gate.
+
+If validation fails, onboarding shows the error and lets you retry.
+
+## SecretRef contract
+
+Use one object shape everywhere:
+
+```json5
+{ source: "env" | "file" | "exec", provider: "default", id: "..." }
+```
+
+### `source: "env"`
+
+```json5
+{ source: "env", provider: "default", id: "OPENAI_API_KEY" }
+```
+
+Validation:
+
+- `provider` must match `^[a-z][a-z0-9_-]{0,63}$`
+- `id` must match `^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]{0,127}$`
+
+### `source: "file"`
+
+```json5
+{ source: "file", provider: "filemain", id: "/providers/openai/apiKey" }
+```
+
+Validation:
+
+- `provider` must match `^[a-z][a-z0-9_-]{0,63}$`
+- `id` must be an absolute JSON pointer (`/...`)
+- RFC6901 escaping in segments: `~` => `~0`, `/` => `~1`
+
+### `source: "exec"`
+
+```json5
+{ source: "exec", provider: "vault", id: "providers/openai/apiKey" }
+```
+
+Validation:
+
+- `provider` must match `^[a-z][a-z0-9_-]{0,63}$`
+- `id` must match `^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:/-]{0,255}$`
+- `id` must not contain `.` or `..` as slash-delimited path segments (for example `a/../b` is rejected)
+
+## Provider config
+
+Define providers under `secrets.providers`:
+
+```json5
+{
+  secrets: {
+    providers: {
+      default: { source: "env" },
+      filemain: {
+        source: "file",
+        path: "~/.openclaw/secrets.json",
+        mode: "json", // or "singleValue"
+      },
+      vault: {
+        source: "exec",
+        command: "/usr/local/bin/openclaw-vault-resolver",
+        args: ["--profile", "prod"],
+        passEnv: ["PATH", "VAULT_ADDR"],
+        jsonOnly: true,
+      },
+    },
+    defaults: {
+      env: "default",
+      file: "filemain",
+      exec: "vault",
+    },
+    resolution: {
+      maxProviderConcurrency: 4,
+      maxRefsPerProvider: 512,
+      maxBatchBytes: 262144,
+    },
+  },
+}
+```
+
+### Env provider
+
+- Optional allowlist via `allowlist`.
+- Missing/empty env values fail resolution.
+
+### File provider
+
+- Reads local file from `path`.
+- `mode: "json"` expects JSON object payload and resolves `id` as pointer.
+- `mode: "singleValue"` expects ref id `"value"` and returns file contents.
+- Path must pass ownership/permission checks.
+- Windows fail-closed note: if ACL verification is unavailable for a path, resolution fails. For trusted paths only, set `allowInsecurePath: true` on that provider to bypass path security checks.
+
+### Exec provider
+
+- Runs configured absolute binary path, no shell.
+- By default, `command` must point to a regular file (not a symlink).
+- Set `allowSymlinkCommand: true` to allow symlink command paths (for example Homebrew shims). OpenClaw validates the resolved target path.
+- Pair `allowSymlinkCommand` with `trustedDirs` for package-manager paths (for example `["/opt/homebrew"]`).
+- Supports timeout, no-output timeout, output byte limits, env allowlist, and trusted dirs.
+- Windows fail-closed note: if ACL verification is unavailable for the command path, resolution fails. For trusted paths only, set `allowInsecurePath: true` on that provider to bypass path security checks.
+
+Request payload (stdin):
+
+```json
+{ "protocolVersion": 1, "provider": "vault", "ids": ["providers/openai/apiKey"] }
+```
+
+Response payload (stdout):
+
+```jsonc
+{ "protocolVersion": 1, "values": { "providers/openai/apiKey": "<openai-api-key>" } } // pragma: allowlist secret
+```
+
+Optional per-id errors:
+
+```json
+{
+  "protocolVersion": 1,
+  "values": {},
+  "errors": { "providers/openai/apiKey": { "message": "not found" } }
+}
+```
+
+## Exec integration examples
+
+### 1Password CLI
+
+```json5
+{
+  secrets: {
+    providers: {
+      onepassword_openai: {
+        source: "exec",
+        command: "/opt/homebrew/bin/op",
+        allowSymlinkCommand: true, // required for Homebrew symlinked binaries
+        trustedDirs: ["/opt/homebrew"],
+        args: ["read", "op://Personal/OpenClaw QA API Key/password"],
+        passEnv: ["HOME"],
+        jsonOnly: false,
+      },
+    },
+  },
+  models: {
+    providers: {
+      openai: {
+        baseUrl: "https://api.openai.com/v1",
+        models: [{ id: "gpt-5", name: "gpt-5" }],
+        apiKey: { source: "exec", provider: "onepassword_openai", id: "value" },
+      },
+    },
+  },
+}
+```
+
+### HashiCorp Vault CLI
+
+```json5
+{
+  secrets: {
+    providers: {
+      vault_openai: {
+        source: "exec",
+        command: "/opt/homebrew/bin/vault",
+        allowSymlinkCommand: true, // required for Homebrew symlinked binaries
+        trustedDirs: ["/opt/homebrew"],
+        args: ["kv", "get", "-field=OPENAI_API_KEY", "secret/openclaw"],
+        passEnv: ["VAULT_ADDR", "VAULT_TOKEN"],
+        jsonOnly: false,
+      },
+    },
+  },
+  models: {
+    providers: {
+      openai: {
+        baseUrl: "https://api.openai.com/v1",
+        models: [{ id: "gpt-5", name: "gpt-5" }],
+        apiKey: { source: "exec", provider: "vault_openai", id: "value" },
+      },
+    },
+  },
+}
+```
+
+### `sops`
+
+```json5
+{
+  secrets: {
+    providers: {
+      sops_openai: {
+        source: "exec",
+        command: "/opt/homebrew/bin/sops",
+        allowSymlinkCommand: true, // required for Homebrew symlinked binaries
+        trustedDirs: ["/opt/homebrew"],
+        args: ["-d", "--extract", '["providers"]["openai"]["apiKey"]', "/path/to/secrets.enc.json"],
+        passEnv: ["SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE"],
+        jsonOnly: false,
+      },
+    },
+  },
+  models: {
+    providers: {
+      openai: {
+        baseUrl: "https://api.openai.com/v1",
+        models: [{ id: "gpt-5", name: "gpt-5" }],
+        apiKey: { source: "exec", provider: "sops_openai", id: "value" },
+      },
+    },
+  },
+}
+```
+
+## MCP server environment variables
+
+MCP server env vars configured via `plugins.entries.acpx.config.mcpServers` support SecretInput. This keeps API keys and tokens out of plaintext config:
+
+```json5
+{
+  plugins: {
+    entries: {
+      acpx: {
+        enabled: true,
+        config: {
+          mcpServers: {
+            github: {
+              command: "npx",
+              args: ["-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-github"],
+              env: {
+                GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN: {
+                  source: "env",
+                  provider: "default",
+                  id: "MCP_GITHUB_PAT",
+                },
+              },
+            },
+          },
+        },
+      },
+    },
+  },
+}
+```
+
+Plaintext string values still work. Env-template refs like `${MCP_SERVER_API_KEY}` and SecretRef objects are resolved during gateway activation before the MCP server process is spawned. As with other SecretRef surfaces, unresolved refs only block activation when the `acpx` plugin is effectively active.
+
+## Sandbox SSH auth material
+
+The core `ssh` sandbox backend also supports SecretRefs for SSH auth material:
+
+```json5
+{
+  agents: {
+    defaults: {
+      sandbox: {
+        mode: "all",
+        backend: "ssh",
+        ssh: {
+          target: "user@gateway-host:22",
+          identityData: { source: "env", provider: "default", id: "SSH_IDENTITY" },
+          certificateData: { source: "env", provider: "default", id: "SSH_CERTIFICATE" },
+          knownHostsData: { source: "env", provider: "default", id: "SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS" },
+        },
+      },
+    },
+  },
+}
+```
+
+Runtime behavior:
+
+- OpenClaw resolves these refs during sandbox activation, not lazily during each SSH call.
+- Resolved values are written to temp files with restrictive permissions and used in generated SSH config.
+- If the effective sandbox backend is not `ssh`, these refs stay inactive and do not block startup.
+
+## Supported credential surface
+
+Canonical supported and unsupported credentials are listed in:
+
+- [SecretRef Credential Surface](/reference/secretref-credential-surface)
+
+Runtime-minted or rotating credentials and OAuth refresh material are intentionally excluded from read-only SecretRef resolution.
+
+## Required behavior and precedence
+
+- Field without a ref: unchanged.
+- Field with a ref: required on active surfaces during activation.
+- If both plaintext and ref are present, ref takes precedence on supported precedence paths.
+- The redaction sentinel `__OPENCLAW_REDACTED__` is reserved for internal config redaction/restore and is rejected as literal submitted config data.
+
+Warning and audit signals:
+
+- `SECRETS_REF_OVERRIDES_PLAINTEXT` (runtime warning)
+- `REF_SHADOWED` (audit finding when `auth-profiles.json` credentials take precedence over `openclaw.json` refs)
+
+Google Chat compatibility behavior:
+
+- `serviceAccountRef` takes precedence over plaintext `serviceAccount`.
+- Plaintext value is ignored when sibling ref is set.
+
+## Activation triggers
+
+Secret activation runs on:
+
+- Startup (preflight plus final activation)
+- Config reload hot-apply path
+- Config reload restart-check path
+- Manual reload via `secrets.reload`
+- Gateway config write RPC preflight (`config.set` / `config.apply` / `config.patch`) for active-surface SecretRef resolvability within the submitted config payload before persisting edits
+
+Activation contract:
+
+- Success swaps the snapshot atomically.
+- Startup failure aborts gateway startup.
+- Runtime reload failure keeps the last-known-good snapshot.
+- Write-RPC preflight failure rejects the submitted config and keeps both disk config and active runtime snapshot unchanged.
+- Providing an explicit per-call channel token to an outbound helper/tool call does not trigger SecretRef activation; activation points remain startup, reload, and explicit `secrets.reload`.
+
+## Degraded and recovered signals
+
+When reload-time activation fails after a healthy state, OpenClaw enters degraded secrets state.
+
+One-shot system event and log codes:
+
+- `SECRETS_RELOADER_DEGRADED`
+- `SECRETS_RELOADER_RECOVERED`
+
+Behavior:
+
+- Degraded: runtime keeps last-known-good snapshot.
+- Recovered: emitted once after the next successful activation.
+- Repeated failures while already degraded log warnings but do not spam events.
+- Startup fail-fast does not emit degraded events because runtime never became active.
+
+## Command-path resolution
+
+Command paths can opt into supported SecretRef resolution via gateway snapshot RPC.
+
+There are two broad behaviors:
+
+- Strict command paths (for example `openclaw memory` remote-memory paths and `openclaw qr --remote` when it needs remote shared-secret refs) read from the active snapshot and fail fast when a required SecretRef is unavailable.
+- Read-only command paths (for example `openclaw status`, `openclaw status --all`, `openclaw channels status`, `openclaw channels resolve`, `openclaw security audit`, and read-only doctor/config repair flows) also prefer the active snapshot, but degrade instead of aborting when a targeted SecretRef is unavailable in that command path.
+
+Read-only behavior:
+
+- When the gateway is running, these commands read from the active snapshot first.
+- If gateway resolution is incomplete or the gateway is unavailable, they attempt targeted local fallback for the specific command surface.
+- If a targeted SecretRef is still unavailable, the command continues with degraded read-only output and explicit diagnostics such as “configured but unavailable in this command path”.
+- This degraded behavior is command-local only. It does not weaken runtime startup, reload, or send/auth paths.
+
+Other notes:
+
+- Snapshot refresh after backend secret rotation is handled by `openclaw secrets reload`.
+- Gateway RPC method used by these command paths: `secrets.resolve`.
+
+## Audit and configure workflow
+
+Default operator flow:
+
+```bash
+openclaw secrets audit --check
+openclaw secrets configure
+openclaw secrets audit --check
+```
+
+### `secrets audit`
+
+Findings include:
+
+- plaintext values at rest (`openclaw.json`, `auth-profiles.json`, `.env`, and generated `agents/*/agent/models.json`)
+- plaintext sensitive provider header residues in generated `models.json` entries
+- unresolved refs
+- precedence shadowing (`auth-profiles.json` taking priority over `openclaw.json` refs)
+- legacy residues (`auth.json`, OAuth reminders)
+
+Exec note:
+
+- By default, audit skips exec SecretRef resolvability checks to avoid command side effects.
+- Use `openclaw secrets audit --allow-exec` to execute exec providers during audit.
+
+Header residue note:
+
+- Sensitive provider header detection is name-heuristic based (common auth/credential header names and fragments such as `authorization`, `x-api-key`, `token`, `secret`, `password`, and `credential`).
+
+### `secrets configure`
+
+Interactive helper that:
+
+- configures `secrets.providers` first (`env`/`file`/`exec`, add/edit/remove)
+- lets you select supported secret-bearing fields in `openclaw.json` plus `auth-profiles.json` for one agent scope
+- can create a new `auth-profiles.json` mapping directly in the target picker
+- captures SecretRef details (`source`, `provider`, `id`)
+- runs preflight resolution
+- can apply immediately
+
+Exec note:
+
+- Preflight skips exec SecretRef checks unless `--allow-exec` is set.
+- If you apply directly from `configure --apply` and the plan includes exec refs/providers, keep `--allow-exec` set for the apply step too.
+
+Helpful modes:
+
+- `openclaw secrets configure --providers-only`
+- `openclaw secrets configure --skip-provider-setup`
+- `openclaw secrets configure --agent <id>`
+
+`configure` apply defaults:
+
+- scrub matching static credentials from `auth-profiles.json` for targeted providers
+- scrub legacy static `api_key` entries from `auth.json`
+- scrub matching known secret lines from `<config-dir>/.env`
+
+### `secrets apply`
+
+Apply a saved plan:
+
+```bash
+openclaw secrets apply --from /tmp/openclaw-secrets-plan.json
+openclaw secrets apply --from /tmp/openclaw-secrets-plan.json --allow-exec
+openclaw secrets apply --from /tmp/openclaw-secrets-plan.json --dry-run
+openclaw secrets apply --from /tmp/openclaw-secrets-plan.json --dry-run --allow-exec
+```
+
+Exec note:
+
+- dry-run skips exec checks unless `--allow-exec` is set.
+- write mode rejects plans containing exec SecretRefs/providers unless `--allow-exec` is set.
+
+For strict target/path contract details and exact rejection rules, see:
+
+- [Secrets Apply Plan Contract](/gateway/secrets-plan-contract)
+
+## One-way safety policy
+
+OpenClaw intentionally does not write rollback backups containing historical plaintext secret values.
+
+Safety model:
+
+- preflight must succeed before write mode
+- runtime activation is validated before commit
+- apply updates files using atomic file replacement and best-effort restore on failure
+
+## Legacy auth compatibility notes
+
+For static credentials, runtime no longer depends on plaintext legacy auth storage.
+
+- Runtime credential source is the resolved in-memory snapshot.
+- Legacy static `api_key` entries are scrubbed when discovered.
+- OAuth-related compatibility behavior remains separate.
+
+## Web UI note
+
+Some SecretInput unions are easier to configure in raw editor mode than in form mode.
+
+## Related docs
+
+- CLI commands: [secrets](/cli/secrets)
+- Plan contract details: [Secrets Apply Plan Contract](/gateway/secrets-plan-contract)
+- Credential surface: [SecretRef Credential Surface](/reference/secretref-credential-surface)
+- Auth setup: [Authentication](/gateway/authentication)
+- Security posture: [Security](/gateway/security)
+- Environment precedence: [Environment Variables](/help/environment)