oclaw/uds-auth/lib/session-acl.js
oliver df97c5e042
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fix(uds-auth): emergency login workspaces, Desktop key prompts, persistent sessions
Emergency (fallback / sealed-box) admins lost the workspace sidebar and saw
"sign-in failed / add API key" on DSH Desktop because the remote.mux opens
anonymously at boot and every early call was rejected terminally.

- gateway: anonymous workspace/follow reaches dsh-acl's empty baseline;
  anonymous streams are parked until the carrier aborts instead of failing;
  anonymous workspace/initializeDefault answers "nothing created"
- request-auth: a dead UDS_SESSION cookie no longer shadows a valid WS ticket
  or bridge (sync + async variants used by all callers)
- dsh-acl: /api/* waits (bounded 15s) for the gateway ACL during Host startup
  instead of 403, so the Desktop welcome read no longer fails
- desktop-bootstrap: key/account projection is best-effort per reference
- client: emit connection/reset after login so boot-time caches (settings
  describe mirror -> Settings > Models) re-read under the real principal
- sessions: absolute lifetime fixed at 7 days (was min(ttl, 7d) = 30 min);
  bridge expiry slides with its session; MemoryStore persisted to
  sessions.json (bearer hash only, userData AES-256-GCM sealed)
- README: session lifetime/persistence and DSH compatibility notes

Also includes previously uncommitted uds-auth 0.3.x work in this tree.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-12 02:11:09 +08:00

132 lines
4 KiB
JavaScript

/**
* Session ownership store — sessionId → empNo.
*
* Used with workspace/cwd checks in dsh-acl.js (owner OR own workspace).
* Missing owner must NOT deny access by itself (legacy sessions).
*/
import { readFile } from 'node:fs/promises'
import { resolve } from 'node:path'
import { getUserContext } from './context.js'
import { ROLES, computePermissions } from './roles.js'
import { atomicWriteJson } from './utils/atomic-write.js'
export class SessionAclStore {
/**
* @param {{ ownersFile?: string }} options
*/
constructor(options = {}) {
this._owners = new Map()
this._ownersFile = options.ownersFile ? resolve(options.ownersFile) : null
this._dirty = false
this._saveTimer = null
}
async init() {
if (!this._ownersFile) return
try {
const raw = await readFile(this._ownersFile, 'utf-8')
const data = JSON.parse(raw)
for (const [sessionId, empNo] of Object.entries(data.owners || {})) {
this._owners.set(String(sessionId), String(empNo))
}
} catch (err) {
if (err.code === 'ENOENT') return
// R09: corrupt ownership must fail closed — do not treat as empty/unowned.
console.error('[uds-auth:SessionAcl] load failed — fail closed:', err.message)
this._loadFailed = true
}
}
get loadFailed() {
return !!this._loadFailed
}
_markDirty() {
this._dirty = true
if (this._saveTimer) return
this._saveTimer = setTimeout(() => { void this._save() }, 1500)
}
async _save() {
this._saveTimer = null
if (!this._dirty || !this._ownersFile) return
this._dirty = false
try {
await atomicWriteJson(this._ownersFile, {
owners: Object.fromEntries(this._owners),
savedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
}, { mode: 0o600 })
} catch (err) {
this._dirty = true
console.warn('[uds-auth:SessionAcl] save failed:', err.message)
}
}
getOwner(sessionId) {
return this._owners.get(String(sessionId)) || null
}
/**
* Stamp owner. Existing foreign owner is NOT overwritten unless force=true (SEC-13).
* @returns {boolean} true if written / already same owner
*/
setOwner(sessionId, empNo, { force = false } = {}) {
if (!sessionId || !empNo) return false
const id = String(sessionId)
const next = String(empNo)
const existing = this._owners.get(id)
if (existing && String(existing) !== next && !force) {
return false
}
this._owners.set(id, next)
this._markDirty()
return true
}
/** All stamped owners for export / analytics. */
listOwners() {
return Array.from(this._owners.entries()).map(([sessionId, empNo]) => ({ sessionId, empNo }))
}
/**
* Filter list/search payloads with an external access predicate.
* @param {{ items?: Array<{ sessionId?: string, id?: string }> }} value
* @param {(sessionId: string, row: object) => boolean} canAccess
*/
filterListValue(value, canAccess) {
if (!value || !Array.isArray(value.items)) return value
const pred = typeof canAccess === 'function' ? canAccess : () => false
return {
...value,
items: value.items.filter((row) => {
const id = row?.sessionId ?? row?.id
return id != null && pred(String(id), row)
}),
}
}
}
/**
* Resolve identity for ACL checks (null = anonymous).
* @param {import('./roles.js').RolesStore} rolesStore
*/
export function identityFromAls(rolesStore) {
const ctx = getUserContext()
if (!ctx?.empNo) return null
const role = ctx.role || rolesStore.getRole(ctx.empNo)
return {
empNo: ctx.empNo,
role,
// Prefer live prefs — ALS identity.permissions may be frozen at WS connect.
permissions: typeof rolesStore.resolvePermissions === 'function'
? rolesStore.resolvePermissions(ctx.empNo, role)
: (ctx.permissions || computePermissions(role)),
}
}
/** @deprecated prefer isAdminClass — 超管只是身份,与 admin / 应急同权 */
export function isSuperLike(role) {
return role === ROLES.SUPER_ADMIN
|| role === ROLES.FALLBACK_ADMIN
|| role === ROLES.ADMIN
}